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A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech
in Workplace Representation Elections
Kate E. Andrias

INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment stands as a guarantor of political freedom and as
the “guardian of our democracy.”1 It seeks to expand the vitality of public
discourse in order to enable Americans to become aware of the issues
before them and to pursue their ends fully and freely.2 As the Supreme
Court wrote in the canonical case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
First Amendment’s function is to create the “uninhibited, robust and wideopen” public debate necessary for the exercise of self-governance.3
The Amendment plays a prominent role in the regulation of workplace
representation elections, the process by which unorganized workers decide
whether or not to unionize. Since the 1940s, and particularly since the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,4 Congress and the courts have
used the First Amendment to protect the right of employers to campaign
against unionization.5 Holding that employers may say nearly anything in
order to persuade their employees to vote “no” in a union election, the
Supreme Court has permitted the National Labor Relations Board to
proscribe employer speech only when it contains threats of reprisal or
1. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982).
2. OWEN M. FISS, IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996).
3. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
4. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945) (“[E]mployers’ attempts to
persuade to action with respect to joining or not joining unions are within the First Amendment’s
guaranty.”).
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coercive promises.6 In so ruling, the Court has sought to balance
employers’ right of free speech, as well as their common-law property and
managerial rights, with workers’ right to unionize. Yet whether deeming
speech to be prohibited or protected, the Court has framed the issue with the
First Amendment weighing only on the side of employers. For the most
part, existing academic work on union elections has implicitly accepted this
approach, viewing employers’ rights of speech, property, and management
as clashing with workers’ statutory right to organize, without invoking any
countervailing First Amendment right on behalf of workers.7
This Note challenges the Court’s approach to the First Amendment for
failing both to recognize and to protect the very real speech interests of
workers and union organizers at stake in workplace representation
6. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618-19 (1968) (upholding the National
Labor Relations Board’s ruling that particular employer speech amounted to an unfair labor
practice, and holding that “an employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his
general views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the
communications do not contain a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit”). This Note will
refer to the National Labor Relations Board as the NLRB or, more simply, the Board.
7. See, e.g., James A. Gross, A Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor Relations
Law: A Violation of the Right of Freedom of Association, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 65,
101 (1999) (applying a human rights perspective, and arguing that the “fundamental human right
of freedom of association should trump employer property and speech rights at the workplace”);
John Logan, Representatives of Their Own Choosing?: Certification, Elections, and Employer
Free Speech, 1935-1959, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549, 567 (2000) (tracing the history of the
Board’s protection of employer speech in the election context, and concluding that the Board
increasingly chose to privilege employer speech over the right to organize); Clyde W. Summers,
Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective Labor Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 791, 806 (1991)
(“Employer speech has become the primary instrument used by employers to discourage
unionization and collective bargaining.”); id. at 802-07.
To the extent that labor scholars address the First Amendment in union elections, they focus
upon whether employer speech receives the appropriate level of constitutional protection. For the
most detailed argument that employer speech does not deserve such extensive protection, see Alan
Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356 (1995). Story concludes that employer speech should not
receive constitutional protection, because (1) the workplace does not function as a marketplace of
ideas, (2) employer speech is a form of commercial speech, and (3) such speech is coercive. See
id. at 456; see also Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections
and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 500-01, 559-65 (1993) (concluding that
employers should be stripped of any legally cognizable interest in their employees’ election of
representatives); Summers, supra, at 806 (arguing that employer speech receives greater
protection than constitutionally required and that “[l]imiting employer speech to that
constitutionally protected would help restore the original purpose of the Wagner Act”). Other
scholars have advocated greater First Amendment protection for employer speech. See, e.g., Julius
Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV.
4, 22 (1984) (arguing for greater First Amendment protection of employer speech, as well as of
labor boycotts and picketing); Beth Z. Margulies, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: A Standard
Without a Following (The Need for Reappraisal of Employer Free Speech Rights in the
Organizing Campaign), 22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 459 (1986) (showing that Gissel is applied
without any consistency, and concluding that such contradictory rulings mean that employer rights
should be expanded); Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Note, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory
Conditions Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (2002) (arguing that restrictions on employer speech
under the laboratory conditions doctrine are unconstitutional and in conflict with legislative
intent).
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elections.8 Building on the work of “democratic” free speech scholars, such
as Alexander Meiklejohn, Owen Fiss, and Cass Sunstein,9 and applying
their theories to a new arena, this Note argues that the Court’s exclusive
focus on safeguarding employer speech from state incursion leaves society
vulnerable to powerful forces of private censorship.10 Specifically, the
8. My goal is to deal with the issue of speech not at work generally, but in the context of
union-organizing attempts; therefore, a full discussion of whether the grant of common-law
managerial and property rights and the ability of employers to silence workers violate the First
Amendment absent a unionization attempt is beyond the scope of this Note. A considerable body
of scholarship deals with the broader issue, persuasively arguing that the First Amendment should
generally protect private-sector workers; there is also some case law supporting this view. See
infra note 13. However, there is virtually no scholarship making a First Amendment argument
about worker speech specifically within the union-organizing context. Workplace representation
elections provide one area in which to interrogate current conceptions of the First Amendment and
the workplace. Furthermore, the argument for a revised conception of First Amendment rights in
the context of workplace elections is even stronger than in the broad context of employment
because union speech is some of the most harshly suppressed speech within the workplace, the
union election context is an area in which there is considerable state involvement in the form of
regulatory laws and enforcement mechanisms, and the decision of whether or not to unionize has
particular relevance to the First Amendment’s democratic purposes.
9. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1948); FISS, supra note 2; OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996)
[hereinafter LIBERALISM DIVIDED]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY]; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now!,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, Free Speech Now]. For a critique of the
democratic theory, see Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform
of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993). My argument also draws from the legal
realist work of such scholars as Jack Balkin, who attacks the neutrality of baselines established by
the common law and recognizes the state as an important force in constructing a democratic
system of free expression. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375.
10. Scholars concerned about the role of the First Amendment in enabling democracy have
focused primarily on campaign finance and control of the media; labor speech—especially speech
in union elections—is little more than a footnote in their major works. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 2
(offering no mention of labor speech or union elections); LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 9
(same); SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 33-34 (briefly discussing that New Dealers
believed employer speech was subject to government regulation, but failing to examine the issue
in any depth or to discuss workers’ speech rights during unionization attempts); see also Balkin,
supra note 9, at 387 (identifying the modern-day “paradigmatic free speech issues” as involving
access to the media, speech in the political process, and hate speech). This Note suggests that, by
failing to treat the issue of speech in workplace elections, First Amendment scholars are missing a
critical locus in which speech rights are exercised or denied and through which our democracy
and public debate are shaped.
Note, however, that significant scholarship does argue for greater First Amendment
protection of worker expression, but in areas other than union elections. For an argument that the
First Amendment should provide greater protection of collective labor speech, such as boycotts
and strikes, see, for example, James G. Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1094-96, 1113-18 (1987) [hereinafter Pope, Labor and
the Constitution]; and James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values:
Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189 (1984). On First Amendment
protection for public-sector workers, see, for example, Owen Fiss, Political Freedom and Public
Employment, The Antonio Carrillo Flores Lectures 16-26 (Mar. 8, 2001) (transcript on file with
author). For an argument supporting greater First Amendment protection for private-sector
workers, see sources cited infra note 13. In addition, there has been considerable debate among
First Amendment scholars about the role of free speech in workplace harassment cases. See, e.g.,
Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory
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regime governing workplace elections allows employers to suppress worker
speech and union messages, even as employers’ own speech is protected. In
so doing, the current law inhibits robust debate and collective selfgovernance both within the workplace and in society at large, and thereby
contravenes the fundamental purpose of the First Amendment.
This Note identifies two distinct, but related, ways in which current
doctrine governing workplace elections restricts the freedom of speech.
First, it constrains the ability of workers to speak freely and limits the
existence of robust debate inside the workplace. The law grants employers
extensive rights to campaign against unionization, including the power to
compel workers to listen, to suppress their responses, and to exclude the
messages of union organizers from the workplace. At the same time, the
law fails to protect effectively worker speech. In fact, over the past halfcentury, reprisals suffered by workers who engage in pro-union speech
have increased dramatically to well over 10,000 documented cases per
year.11
Second, the suppression of worker speech and the exclusion of prounion messages within the workplace hinders employees’ exercise of free
speech and the existence of robust debate outside of the workplace as well.
When Americans spend much of their time without rights of expression and
collective self-governance, they lose some ability to participate as active
citizens in our society’s democratic project. Furthermore, because the
suppression of worker speech and pro-union messages enables employers to
thwart the formation of unions, the ability of individual worker-citizens to
engage effectively in public debate through their own collective
organizations is impeded.
For these reasons, the First Amendment permits, and indeed requires,
us to revise the flawed regime governing workplace representation
elections, even if doing so entails some further limits on employer speech.12
Toward that end, this Note will propose a new framework that protects
worker speech and union messages, a framework more faithful to the First
Amendment’s purpose of safeguarding democracy.
Part I of this Note examines the historical development of the “false
paradigm,” which views employers’ First Amendment rights as in tension

Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and
Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992).
11. See COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT 81
(1994) [hereinafter FACT FINDING REPORT].
12. The notion that the First Amendment allows the state to regulate some speech in order to
enable other speech and to further democracy has gained a foothold in several recent concurring
opinions authored by Justice Breyer. See infra notes 202-210 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the concept of the state as parliamentarian, capable of intervening to protect speech,
see FISS, supra note 2, at 21-25, 28; and OWEN M. FISS, The Right Kind of Neutrality, in
LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 9, at 109, 117-19.
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with statutory collective bargaining rights. It shows that, in the face of
concerted pressure from employer groups, the Court, the Board, and
Congress increasingly recast property and managerial rights in First
Amendment terms while failing to consider the Amendment’s democratic
purposes. Narrowly focused on protecting individual autonomy from
incursion by the state, the Court granted extensive First Amendment
protection to employers but neglected the speech interests of workers and
union organizers. Part II argues for a revised paradigm: Speech vs. Speech.
This Part discusses how employer speech silences workers, and
demonstrates that the current doctrine governing union elections fails to
provide effective remedies for employer retaliation against pro-union
speech, limits the right of workers not to hear employer speech, and
constrains the ability of pro-union workers and union organizers to
communicate their messages. Part III looks at the purposes of the First
Amendment and argues that the jurisprudence on union elections fails to
fulfill those purposes, both inside and outside the workplace. Part IV
considers what a regime that protects worker and union free speech
interests and furthers the democratic aims of the First Amendment might
look like. It argues that new regulations on employer speech, as well as
regulations to enable worker and union speech, are not only vital public
policy, but are both permitted and required by the First Amendment.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FALSE PARADIGM OF FREE SPEECH VS.
WORKERS’ RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
Generally speaking, the First Amendment is not thought to protect
private-sector employees within the workplace. Under conventional
jurisprudence, a private employer may fire a worker for expressing her
political views, without raising First Amendment objections, because the
private employer is not considered a state actor.13 Furthermore, under
13. In contrast, public-sector employees have First Amendment protection from employer
retaliation on the basis of their speech if their speech touches on matters of public concern. This is
because public employers are considered state actors within traditional First Amendment doctrine.
Cf. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that, although public-employee speech of
public concern is protected, a particular public employee’s grievance was not a matter of public
concern and was therefore unprotected by the First Amendment).
There are strong arguments to be made both against the distinction between public and
private employers, and for general First Amendment protections for private-sector employees.
See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the First Amendment
as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 341 (1994) (arguing that
courts should use the First Amendment to protect employees fired for expression of political
views); Terry Ann Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for
Reform, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 42 (1987) (urging the importance of the workplace as a First
Amendment forum, and challenging the state action requirement). A few courts have accepted the
argument that the First Amendment should serve as a public-policy exemption to the doctrine of
employment-at-will. For example, the Third Circuit in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co. held
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American common law, private-sector employees are without general legal
protection against arbitrary discipline or discharge. The doctrine of
employment-at-will mandates that, in the absence of a contract for a
specific duration, an employee may be fired “for good cause, for no cause
or even for cause morally wrong.”14 Combined with the Court’s narrow
focus on protecting the individual speaker from state action, this means that
workers effectively have minimal rights of speech at work: An employer
has the right to control what messages are expressed on its own property
and to fire or discipline workers at will, provided that its actions do not
violate other specific statutory or common-law requirements.15
One statute that creates protections for worker speech is the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).16 The Act prohibits employers from
discriminating against workers for union activity and creates protections for
worker speech relating to unionization.17 However, these protections are
statutory, not constitutional. In contrast, employers are deemed to have a
constitutional right to speak against unionization; that is, any constraint
placed on employer campaigning by the NLRB is viewed as state action
and, therefore, is suspect under the First Amendment. Thus, even though
both workers and employees are protected from government interference,
employers enjoy a constitutionally protected right to speak while employees
within a private-sector workplace effectively do not. This was not always
the case: In the early years of the NLRA, employers did not have a
that the First Amendment represents a cognizable expression of public policy for purposes of a
wrongful discharge claim against a private-sector employer. 721 F.2d 894, 899-90 (3d Cir. 1983).
For further discussion, including exploration of state statutes and jurisprudence finding a free
speech right for all employees, see Bingham, supra, at 349-54.
14. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
15. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101
(1995) (arguing that in light of the employment-at-will relationship and the lack of due process in
the workplace, employees possess little freedom of speech, and advocating a universal just-cause
requirement).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
17. Employee speech is protected by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act when it
involves “concerted activities” for the purpose of workers’ “mutual aid or protection.” Id. § 157.
The right to free speech as a form of concerted activity is considered so “fundamental” to the Act
that it may not be bargained away by union negotiators. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322
(1974). Moreover, the Court has ruled that the Act includes as concerted activity speech aimed at
improving the circumstances of a group of employees, even when the issue is not specific to
contract negotiations. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (holding that section 7
protection covered a union newsletter that criticized a presidential veto of an increase in the
federal minimum wage). In order to trigger the protections of the Act, worker speech must be
either entwined with worker group action or involve preparation for such action. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973). In addition, the employer must be
aware of the concerted activity. NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1977). For
further discussion, see Halbert, supra note 13, at 53-56. For an argument that protection of speech
under section 7 is too limited, see Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee
Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the NLRA, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921,
1002 (1992) (arguing for an expansion of the scope of section 7 “to include employee protest
directed at the product or service or nonlabor practices of the employer”).
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constitutionally protected right to campaign against unionization, and
restrictions on employer speech were not perceived as violations of the First
Amendment.18
Before examining the current rules governing workplace representation
elections and why they raise fundamental First Amendment issues, it is
necessary to analyze the development of the concept of employer free
speech. A look at this history reveals that, in the years following the
passage of the NLRA, employers successfully rephrased Lochner-era
arguments about property rights, liberty, and the social status quo in the
language of the First Amendment in a bid to maintain control over the
workplace.19 Over time, Congress and the Supreme Court increasingly
accepted these arguments and enshrined the right of employer anti-union
campaigning in the First Amendment, while failing to consider issues of
worker speech.20

18. See infra Section I.A.
19. This history calls into question a common assumption among free speech scholars that the
First Amendment has until recently been the province of liberals, and only of late has it been
invoked by the economically and socially powerful to suppress equality and democracy. Many
First Amendment scholars have remarked on the recent co-optation of the First Amendment: Jack
Balkin identifies a “transformation . . . overtaking the principle of free speech today.” Balkin,
supra note 9, at 393. He argues that “[b]usiness interests and other conservative groups are finding
that arguments for property rights and the social status quo can more and more easily be rephrased
in the language of the first amendment by using the very same absolutist forms of argument
offered by the left in previous generations.” Id.; see also id. (“Just as the concepts of ‘liberty’ and
‘equality’ were co-opted by laissez-faire conservatism in the 1870s, so too ‘pluralism’ and ‘free
speech’ are slowly being co-opted by the right today.”); Robert Post, Introduction to CENSORSHIP
AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 1, 1 (Robert Post ed., 1998) (“Aligned
along predictable and venerable divisions separating liberals from conservatives, oriented toward
ancient and well-rehearsed chestnuts such as obscenity and national security, the topic [of
censorship] promised little of analytic interest. In recent years . . . the landscape of censorship has
altered dramatically.”). Similarly, according to Owen Fiss, for most of the twentieth century
“liberals were . . . united under the banner of free speech,” OWEN M. FISS, Introduction to
LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 9, at 1, 1 [hereinafter FISS, Introduction]; however, this
changed “in the seventies . . . when the Supreme Court was faced with a number of free speech
cases that required it to examine the relationship of political and economic power” and capitalism
increasingly began to trump democracy in First Amendment jurisprudence, OWEN M. FISS, Free
Speech and Social Structure, in LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 9, at 7, 9-10 [hereinafter FISS,
Social Structure].
While First Amendment scholars may be correct that the major free speech debates have
only recently focused on the tension between capitalism and democracy, the history of the
employer free speech doctrine shows that there is a long tradition of powerful economic interests
employing the First Amendment to protect the status quo.
20. Without a doubt, the historical moments and movements are considerably more
complicated than I present them here. For a more thorough treatment, see IRVING BERNSTEIN,
TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933-1941 (1970); and HOWELL
JOHN HARRIS, THE RIGHT TO MANAGE: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS POLICIES OF AMERICAN
BUSINESSES IN THE 1940S (1982). Furthermore, although I look at the legislative debates over the
National Labor Relations Act and the development of the employer-speech doctrine, I do not aim
to provide a comprehensive legislative history of the Wagner or Taft-Hartley Acts, nor do I fully
or adequately trace developments in labor-law doctrine. There are several pieces that provide
thorough analyses along those lines. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 7; Story, supra note 7.
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A. Passage of the Wagner Act and the Initial Limits on
Employer Campaigning
While employers today enjoy extensive managerial and property rights
over their employees, their rights were much broader prior to the 1930s. In
the heyday of substantive due process—the Lochner era—courts repeatedly
struck down protective labor legislation on the ground that it
unconstitutionally deprived employers of their property rights and their
right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.21 Following a period of
labor strife and turmoil, the Court moved away from this analysis and, in
the 1930s, began to uphold pro-labor legislation.22
In 1935, as part of the New Deal, the NLRA was passed.23 The law,
also known as the Wagner Act, signaled a major shift in the regulation of
the workplace and established significant new limits on employer rights. It
guaranteed employees “the right to self-organization”24 and established a
system by which the government would certify unions and require
employers to bargain collectively with workers. In the years immediately
following the Act’s passage, the NLRB—the administrative agency
established to enforce the Act—did not allow employers to urge their
employees not to unionize; any campaigning against unionization by an
employer was considered to be an unfair labor practice under the Act.25 The
Board’s determination was based on the economic power wielded by the
21. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York State
statute imposing a ceiling on the hours worked in bakeries on the grounds that New York had
exceeded its police powers and interfered with the liberty guaranteed to all persons under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding a state
labor law against “yellow-dog” contracts, which conditioned employment on forgoing union
membership); Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930)
(upholding a federal law that prohibited employers from discharging employees for joining
unions). Notably, according to unionists, the rights to organize, boycott, strike, and picket were
fundamental rights that predated the New Deal statutes, and their source was to be found in the
Constitution, particularly in the First and Thirteenth Amendments. James G. Pope, The Thirteenth
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional
Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002). The change in the Court’s approach was a
result not only of political mobilization, but also of mass labor unrest; in the years prior to the
New Deal, labor implemented its own constitutional vision through then-prohibited strikes and
boycotts. See id. at 59-60.
23. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
25. For a full discussion of the early jurisprudence on the right of employers to campaign, see
Becker, supra note 7, at 535-40 & nn.174-92. Note that, initially, the Board regularly certified
unions without elections. Workers were able to demonstrate support for a union and to gain
certification once a majority of workers had signed union cards. Id. at 535. This process limited
the ability of employers to influence the outcome of a unionization effort because workers could
organize without employer knowledge. Therefore, the issue of whether employers could campaign
was less relevant. However, even after the Board began requiring elections as the exclusive means
of testing majority support, it barred employers from campaigning. Id. at 536.
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employer. Employer persuasion, it reasoned, could not be separated from
coercion.26 The ban on employer campaigning was most forcefully stated in
the 1942 case of American Tube Bending Co.27 In ruling that American
Tube had violated the law by urging its employees through letters and mass
meetings to vote against the union, the Board explained that the Wagner
Act entitled employees to choose “their bargaining representatives free
from employer interference” and that the employer had a duty “to maintain
complete neutrality with respect to an election.”28
Unable to rely on substantive due process and freedom-to-contract
arguments previously available during the Lochner era, employers
increasingly began to use First Amendment theories to challenge the federal
agency’s interference with the workplace.29 Initially, both the Board and
reviewing federal appeals courts flatly rejected the argument that employer
speech deserved First Amendment protection, holding instead that such
protection would not serve the Amendment’s democratic aims.30 Quoting
an earlier Second Circuit holding authored by Learned Hand, the Board in
American Tube wrote:
“The privilege of ‘free speech,’ like other privileges, is not
absolute; it has its seasons; a democratic society has an acute
interest in its protection and cannot indeed live without it; but it is
an interest measured by its purpose. That purpose is to enable
others to make an informed judgment as to what concerns them,
and ends so far as the utterances do not contribute to the result.
Language may serve to enlighten a hearer, though it also betrays
the speaker’s feelings and desires; but the light it sheds will be in
some degree clouded, if the hearer is in his power.”31

26. The Board also “reasoned that employers could not vote and did not appear on the ballot
as candidates in representation elections and therefore had no legitimate interest in the outcome.”
Id. at 536-37.
27. 44 N.L.R.B. 121, 133-34 (1942).
28. Id. at 129.
29. Until the New Deal, employers generally challenged workplace regulation with economic
liberty and freedom-to-contract arguments. But the period that saw the passage of the Wagner Act
also witnessed a loss of faith in the ideals of laissez-faire capitalism and an end to the Lochner era.
Slippery slope arguments against regulation carried less weight; employers were no longer able to
assert simply that the sacred right of liberty was being violated, as a new regime of democratic
pluralism took hold. Balkin, supra note 9, at 391. As Professor Balkin argues, given the demise of
substantive due process and economic liberalism, and the rise of democratic pluralism, “it is not
difficult to see why the first amendment [came] to occupy a special position in the pantheon of
constitutionally protected liberties.” Id. at 392 (citations omitted). Notably, however, Balkin
identifies the use of the First Amendment by the socially and economically powerful, in place of
liberty arguments, as occurring much later than during the 1930s and 1940s. See supra note 19.
30. For further discussion of the “democratic” purpose of the First Amendment, see infra
Section III.A.
31. 44 N.L.R.B. at 133-34 (quoting NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir.
1941)).
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Notably, the Board and the Second Circuit did not focus on the narrow
question of state action but, rather, looked to the underlying purposes of the
First Amendment.32
Thus, during the initial years of the NLRA, employer campaigning was
wholly proscribed and not considered protected speech within the meaning
of the First Amendment. The Board ordered, and federal appeals courts
enforced, strict limits on the ability of employers to campaign against
unions, ruling that employer campaigning would not further the democratic
aims of the First Amendment—to enable citizens to make an “‘informed
judgment as to what concerns them.’”33 While the Supreme Court never
spoke directly on the issue, it declined to overturn appeals court decisions
that enforced Board rulings proscribing all employer campaigning and
demanding employers remain neutral with respect to the question of
unionization.
B. Emergence of the Employer’s Freedom-of-Speech Right
Despite the initial rejection of their First Amendment claim, employers
continued to rely on free speech arguments as they challenged the Board’s
requirement that they remain neutral during union elections. In addition to
making their First Amendment arguments in court, they lobbied vigorously
for legislative changes to the NLRA that would enable them to campaign
against unionization.34 Employers were waging these efforts in the context
of rapid organization of American workers: In the fourteen years following
the passage of the Wagner Act, total union membership in the United States
increased sharply, from about 3.7 million to more than 14.5 million.35
Particularly during World War II and the immediate postwar period,
32. While American Tube was an administrative decision, not a Supreme Court ruling, it
followed the logic of prior Court cases, particularly a 1940 case, International Ass’n of Machinists
v. NLRB. 311 U.S. 72 (1940). Without ruling on the Board’s requirement that the employer
maintain total neutrality—unable to take a position on unionization or campaign in any way—the
Supreme Court accepted the Board’s reasoning about the coercive impact of employer
campaigning and upheld the Board’s requirement that employers remain neutral toward
competing unions. The Court emphasized that employer speech was coercive given the power
imbalance in the employment relationship, stating that employer suggestions have a “telling effect
among men who know the consequences of incurring that employer’s strong displeasure.” Id. at
78.
33. American Tube Bending Co., 44 N.L.R.B. at 134 (quoting Federbush Co., 121 F.2d at
957).
34. Logan, supra note 7, at 558-63. For a discussion of the ultimately successful “free
speech” amendment and other changes to the NLRA, see infra notes 49-60 and accompanying
text.
35. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND
THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 148, 252 (1985). By 1947,
unions represented 31.8% of the “non-farm labor” work force. Id. at 252. See generally
BERNSTEIN, supra note 20 (describing the development of widespread unionism and collective
bargaining during the New Deal period).
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American industry was racked by a series of paralyzing strikes.36
Responding to the surge in union activity, corporate and business leaders
pressured Congress to enact amendments to the NLRA that would constrain
further union growth and enable management to reassert control.37 In
particular, they focused on establishing a right to campaign in union
elections, which they termed a “free speech” right.38
Increasingly, the free speech arguments articulated by business interests
gained acceptance and began to make their way into court decisions.39 In
1941, the issue reached the Supreme Court in the case of NLRB v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co.40 The employer, Virginia Electric, challenged the
Board’s finding that its anti-union speeches amounted to unfair labor
practices; it argued that the Board rules were “repugnant to the First
Amendment.”41 In order to avoid the First Amendment objections, the
Court interpreted the Wagner Act to reach only coercive or threatening
speech. That is, the Court made clear that the Board could no longer insist
on absolute neutrality by proscribing all employer campaigning. Rather, it
would be required to evaluate whether speech was coercive in the context
of the totality of the employer’s conduct.42
Then, in 1945, the Supreme Court explicitly declared in Thomas v.
Collins that the First Amendment protected employers’ speech in union
campaigns.43 Notably, there were no limits on employer speech actually at
issue in Thomas; instead, the case involved the question of whether the state

36. See generally GEORGE LIPSITZ, RAINBOW AT MIDNIGHT 20-22, 99-154, 182 (describing
mass strikes and labor unrest during the post-war period).
37. Story, supra note 7, at 358 (citing HARRIS, supra note 20, at 109). Employers sought
changes to the legislation that would ensure their right to campaign against unionization, prohibit
union security clauses in contracts, create extensive regulation of unions’ internal affairs, increase
the ability of courts to enjoin strikes, and ban sit-down strikes and boycotts. See HARRIS, supra
note 20, at 109-10.
38. Much of the business community believed that the power balance in labor relations had
been unfairly skewed against management, and correcting that imbalance would involve
“guaranteeing employers free speech—that is, the right to issue propaganda during union
organizing drives, representation elections, strikes or indeed on any occasion when unionism
could be attacked.” HARRIS, supra note 20, at 109.
39. One explanation for this shift is provided by Craig Becker. Becker describes the intense
political pressure brought to bear against the Board as the New Deal reform period ended. Becker,
supra note 7, at 508-10. The Board’s practice of certifying unions without conducting an election
drew especially fierce opposition, and, in 1939, the Board abandoned this practice and signaled
that it would rely exclusively on elections. Id. at 509-12; see also Armour & Co., 13 N.L.R.B.
567, 572-73 (1939); Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 531-32 (1939). According to Becker,
“The Board’s placement of the contest over union representation in an exclusively electoral
framework lent new power to employers’ arguments that their campaign rhetoric belonged at the
core of the liberties protected by the Constitution.” Becker, supra note 7, at 543.
40. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
41. Id. at 477.
42. Id. at 477-78 (citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 78 (1940)).
43. 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).

ANDRIASFINAL

2426

6/8/2003 5:27 PM

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 112: 2415

of Texas could suppress union speech.44 But rather than limiting its holding
to that question, the Court went out of its way to establish that employers
had rights to campaign freely: “[E]mployers’ attempts to persuade to action
with respect to joining or not joining unions are within the First
Amendment’s guaranty.”45 Although citing Virginia Electric as precedent
for this proposition, Thomas, in fact, represented the first time the Court
was explicitly finding such a First Amendment right.46 The Court noted that
employer speech was subject to some limits, but it emphasized that the
speech deserved broad protection: “When to this persuasion other things are
added which bring about coercion, or give it that character, the limit of the
right has been passed. But short of that limit the employer’s freedom cannot
be impaired.”47 Thus, with little explanation by the Court for the
jurisprudential shift, “freedom of speech” had now firmly entered the
lexicon of Court jurisprudence on union elections.
C. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act: Codifying Employer “Free Speech” While
Restricting Employee Expression
Following Virginia Electric and Thomas, employers continued to
advocate for changes to the NLRA that would codify their judicially
granted right to campaign against unionization.48 With the enactment of the
Taft-Hartley Act in June 1947, employer groups and their congressional
allies achieved their goal of a free speech amendment to the NLRA.49 The
new provision, section 8(c), stated:

44. Thomas involved a Texas statute that required labor organizers to register and obtain
organizers’ cards before soliciting members. Id. at 519-20 n.1. Texas officials arrested and
convicted of contempt a union leader who traveled to the state and gave a speech without
registering and in violation of a restraining order. The Court overturned the union leader’s
conviction on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 543. For a more detailed discussion of Thomas,
see Becker, supra note 7, at 543-45; and Story, supra note 7, at 376-78.
45. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 537.
46. See Becker, supra note 7, at 543-44.
47. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 537-38 (citations omitted).
48. The Roosevelt Court and the Board were deemed unpredictable by employer groups.
HARRIS, supra note 20, at 109.
49. In addition to the free speech amendment, the Act contained significant new restrictions
on union activity. For example, the new section 2(3) withdrew the right to organize from
independent contractors and supervisors. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act,
ch. 120, sec. 101, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 137 (1947). Changes to section 7 made explicit that
employees have the right to refrain from union activity, § 7, 61 Stat. at 140, and the new section
14(b) enabled states to outlaw the union shop, § 14(b), 61 Stat. at 151. The new section 8(b)
outlawed certain forms of concerted activity, including secondary boycotts, and enabled
employers to sue in federal court to enjoin unprotected strikes and boycotts. § 8(b), 61 Stat. at
141-43. For further discussion, see ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 87-92 (13th ed. 2001);
and HARRIS, supra note 20, at 1118-27. The Taft-Hartley Act was bitterly opposed by labor
unions and other liberals; it was vetoed by President Truman and passed over his veto. COX ET
AL., supra, at 88.
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The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under any provisions of this act, if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.50
The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor that
accompanied the Taft-Hartley Bill maintained that the changes were rooted
in the Constitution: “[The bill] guarantees, to employees, to employers, and
to their respective representatives, the full exercise of the right of free
speech.”51
Throughout the debates, senators and congressmen emphasized that the
free speech amendment would protect one of “the fundamentals of
liberty.”52 However, a holistic reading of the debates and their historical
context reveals that the liberty at issue was the employers’ freedom to
campaign against unionization, and the speech referred to was that of
employers alone. While the amendment was stated in neutral terms, and
purported to guarantee the speech rights of workers and union
representatives as well as employers, it was intended specifically to codify
the speech rights given to employers in Thomas and to overrule such
employer-restrictive administrative decisions as American Tube.53
Moreover, the bill’s proponents expressed virtually no concern about how
the legislation might affect worker speech or public debate.
Indeed, the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act was driven by employers’
efforts to reassert their managerial and property rights over the workplace54
and to rein in the rising political influence of labor.55 Legislators explicitly
stated that changes in the bill—such as bans on secondary and mass
picketing, the increased ability of courts to enjoin strikes, and the employerspeech provision—were aimed at constraining collective action by workers
in order to reduce labor strife.56 They also made clear that the bill sought to
50. § 8(c), 61 Stat. at 142 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000)).
51. H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 6 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 297 (1948) [hereinafter LMRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The Act’s proponents cited Thomas as evidence that to include a free
speech guarantee in the Act would confirm a preexisting constitutional right. S. REP. NO. 80-105,
at 23 (1947), reprinted in 1 id. at 407, 429.
52. 93 CONG. REC. 5094 (daily ed. May 9, 1947) (statement of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in
2 id. at 1347, 1432.
53. Becker, supra note 7, at 546 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 84, reprinted in 1 LMRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 51, at 292, 375, and S. REP NO. 80-105, at 23, reprinted in 1
id. at 407, 429). The Senate Report explicitly stated that it believed the Board’s interpretation of
Thomas and employer free speech rights to be “too restrictive.” S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 23,
reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 51, at 407, 429-30.
54. See HARRIS, supra note 20, at 59-60, 109-25.
55. LIPSITZ, supra note 36, at 173.
56. See H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 6, reprinted in 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
51, at 292, 297; House Bill Likely To Curb Walkouts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1947, at 3.
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limit the participation of unions in the public debate. One proposal
advocated by Representative Hartley would have prohibited newspaper
editorial writers from membership in the American Newspaper Guild.
Hartley was explicit that his goal was to censor pro-union and leftist
messages. By preventing opinion writers from becoming union members,
Hartley reasoned, “people, at least through the editorials, will be able to get
honest opinions, not influenced by communistic influence.”57 Business
leaders agreed. They saw the Taft-Hartley Act as a way to prevent the
continual mobilization of political opinion on the part of labor leaders.
Without such changes, one business leader stated, “it is inevitable that we
will drift into a socialist dictatorship.”58
Furthermore, the same senators and representatives who were such
staunch advocates of “free speech” in union elections proved to be no
strong civil libertarians when the ideas at issue posed a radical critique of
the American political system. The free speech amendment was adopted by
the Senate just before it voted on and approved an amendment requiring
that no union be certified if any of its officers “is or ever has been a
member of the Communist Party or by reason of active and consistent
promotion or support of the policies, teachings, and doctrines of the
Communist Party can reasonably be regarded as being a member of or
affiliated with such a party.”59 The other statutory changes, including limits
on mass picketing and secondary boycotts, were also motivated, at least in
part, by anxiety about the spread of Communism, yet they aimed to
constrain workers’ expressive activity in a way that reached far beyond any
“clear and present danger.”60
57. H. Walton Cloke, Hartley Outlines Labor Law “Equity,” N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1947, at
19.
58. House Bill Likely To Curb Walkouts, supra note 56.
59. 93 CONG. REC. 5095 (daily ed. May 9, 1947), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 51, at 1434. A version of the anti-Communist provision ultimately passed
and effectively required union leaders to forswear Communist Party loyalties on penalty of losing
NLRA protections. See Labor Management Relations Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 504 (2000).
60. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that speech could be
criminalized only if “the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent”). While the Court tolerated significant limits on speech in the name of fear of
communism during the height of the Cold War, see, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (applying the “clear and present danger” test, and upholding criminal conspiracy
convictions of members of the American Communist Party), broad suppression of radical and
even revolutionary political speech has since been repudiated and a liberal attitude toward dissent
embraced in the law, see, e.g., Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (holding that
membership in the Communist Party is not a sufficient grounds for punishment and that the
evidence must show that the defendant’s actions were calculated to incite violent overthrow of the
government); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (overturning convictions of
Communists on the grounds that in order to be guilty of unlawful advocacy, not only must one
believe in the violent overthrow of the government, but one must also attempt to incite an
audience to engage in such conduct). See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
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Union leaders vehemently opposed the new restraints on collective
action and the increased emphasis on employer speech.61 Labor supporters
recognized that the amendments, and particularly the free speech
amendment, would not only restrict workers’ right to organize but would
also limit workers’ freedom of speech and the ability of working people to
communicate their political goals effectively. Most prominently, Senator
Wagner denounced the free speech amendment, arguing that it would
suppress, rather than enhance, the exercise of free speech in American
society:
The talk of restoring free speech to the employer is a polite way of
reintroducing employer interference, economic retaliation, and
other insidious means of discouraging union membership and union
activity, thereby greatly diminishing and restricting the exercise of
free speech and free choice by the working men and women of
America. No constitutional principle can support this . . . .62
D. From General Shoe to Gissel: Balancing Employer Free Speech with
Employees’ Right To Organize
Despite Senator Wagner’s warning about the effect of the Taft-Hartley
Act on workers’ exercise of free speech, subsequent Board and judicial
decisions continued to see the First Amendment only on the side of
employers. This is not to say that the Board did not maintain limits on
employer speech; it did. However, the Board and reviewing courts
continued to justify those limits in terms of their effect on workers’ right to
organize without identifying any free speech interests on the part of
workers.

(allowing proscriptions against advocating force only when advocacy has become incitement to
“imminent lawless action”). For a general discussion of the Communist cases and the Court’s
adoption of the liberal position, see HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICA 211-26 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). For further discussion of suppression of
political dissent during the McCarthy era, see ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
255-62 (1998).
The Taft-Hartley Act should thus be seen as having been shaped by a reactionary movement
that curtailed political speech broadly, a move that has since been repudiated. Locating the
amendments in the historical context of McCarthyism further supports this Note’s argument that
the current regime of union elections, as codified by those amendments, administered by the
Board, and enforced by the courts, restricts the freedom of speech and robust public debate.
61. See Pressman Attacks Labor Curb Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1947, at 5; Louis Stark,
Green at Senate Hearing Rejects All Labor Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1947, at 1; see also Pope,
supra note 22, at 98-99.
62. 93 CONG. REC. A895 (1947), reprinted in 2 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
51, at 935, 935 (emphasis added); see also Wagner Is “Proud” of His Labor Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 1947, at 14.
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Ten months after the Act took effect, the Board decided General
Shoe,63 a decision that has since guided the Board’s determination of
electoral misconduct. In General Shoe, the Board sought to maintain
restrictions on employer campaigning. Circumventing, to some extent, the
Taft-Hartley Act’s insistence that employer speech did not constitute an
unfair labor practice, the Board created a new doctrine that required
elections to take place in “laboratory conditions.”64 The Board emphasized
the employer’s authority over employees, holding that certain extreme
employer conduct could poison the necessary laboratory conditions and
require that the election be overturned, even if the speech of the employer
did not qualify as an unfair labor practice when examined in isolation.65 The
Board made clear that it saw its task as protecting employees’ freedom to
choose bargaining representatives. Critically, it did not suggest that
employee speech rights might be at play as well.
The Board’s focus in General Shoe on examining total conditions to
determine whether an election can be overturned remains good law today.
But the Supreme Court clarified the standard for evaluating employer
speech in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.66 Stating that section 8(c) “merely
implements the First Amendment,”67 the majority wrote, “[A]n employer’s
free speech right to communicate his views to his employees is firmly
established and cannot be infringed by a union or the Board.”68 Although
the Court affirmed the constitutional status given to employer speech, it
also made clear that the free speech right was not unfettered and must be
balanced with the statutory right of employees to associate freely. It noted
that the balancing of employee and employer rights must take into “account
the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the
necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up
intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a
more disinterested ear.”69 While the Court recognized the coercive impact
of employer speech and continued to maintain limits on it, once again the
Court failed to consider whether any speech rights of workers might be at
stake.

63. Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
64. Id. at 127 (holding that “it is the Board’s function to provide a laboratory in which an
experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the
uninhibited desires of the employees. . . . When . . . the requisite laboratory conditions are not
present . . . the experiment must be conducted over again.” (citation omitted)).
65. Id.
66. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
67. Id. at 617.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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E. Locating Employer Speech Within First Amendment Doctrine
In sum, the historical development of the one-sided free speech
paradigm demonstrates that the Court increasingly protected employer
speech under the First Amendment, while it failed to recognize worker
speech interests as constitutionally protected. This doctrinal development
must be understood not just as a response to employer efforts to reassert
control over the workplace and to limit the political influence of unions, but
also as having been shaped by broader First Amendment jurisprudence.
Following World War I, and during the period discussed above, the Court
increasingly limited the ability of the state to restrict speech. In so doing,
the Court focused on protecting the individual speaker’s autonomy from
state incursion.70 While this doctrinal development critically expanded
protection for the political dissenter, it also entailed a narrow focus on state
action, positing the state as the enemy of free speech rather than a potential
guarantor of speech rights.71
The Court’s narrow focus on restraining the state, without considering
private censorship or the First Amendment’s democratic purpose, can be
clearly seen in the union election context. The Court, from Thomas to
Gissel, guarded against state (NLRB) encroachments on employers’ right of
expression and their broader common-law rights of property and
managerial control. Through the old Wagner Act and the NLRB, the state
was the “enemy” attempting to silence the employer. Any curbs on
employer speech by the state were highly suspect. Conversely, employer
restrictions on worker speech were seen as lacking state action and,
therefore, were beyond the reach of the First Amendment. While the Court
allowed some limits on employer expression because of statutory collective
bargaining rights, defending the First Amendment meant curbing the stateimposed restrictions on employer speech.
Many labor academics who write about union elections, irrespective of
political persuasion, implicitly accept the Court’s First Amendment
approach. They view employer speech and managerial rights as in tension
with workers’ statutory right to organize, not with any countervailing free
speech right. One progressive labor scholar describes the doctrinal
development outlined above as follows: “[T]he courts and the embattled
labor board increasingly protected the employers’ right to free speech
rather than the workers’ right to select bargaining representatives free

70. FISS, Social Structure, supra note 19, at 12; FISS, Why the State?, in LIBERALISM
DIVIDED, supra note 9, at 31, 37.
71. FISS, Social Structure, supra note 19, at 13; FISS, supra note 70, at 37-38. For further
discussion and critique of the Court’s approach, see infra notes 143-159 and accompanying text.
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from employer interference.”72 The academic debate centers on how much
constitutional protection employer speech deserves. Some authors focus on
the coercion inherent in employer speech and its commercial nature,
demanding stricter limits on such speech,73 while their opponents argue that
the NLRB’s restrictions on employer speech are problematic or
unconstitutional.74 To the extent that such scholars consider issues of
worker speech, they do so within the larger context of workers’ right to
organize.75 In so doing, they implicitly accept the Court’s conception of the
First Amendment as protecting employer speech from state incursion, but
not employee speech from employer incursion.
II. REVISING THE PARADIGM: SPEECH VS. SPEECH, WITHIN THE
WORKPLACE
This Part reframes the free speech paradigm within workplace
representation elections as Speech vs. Speech. First, it shows that a great
deal of coercive employer speech is permitted under the current regime, and
argues that this employer speech not only limits the statutory rights of
workers to unionize, but also silences worker speech and pro-union
messages. Second, this Part shows that while the Court has emphasized the
primacy of employer free speech, it has failed to prevent employer
retaliation against pro-union speech. Third, the Court has interpreted the
NLRA so as to limit the right of workers not to hear employer speech.
Finally, it has constrained the ability of pro-union workers and union
organizers to communicate their messages. In short, Congress, the Board,
and the federal courts have created and enforced a doctrine that constrains
worker speech, excludes union messages, and prevents a meaningful and
free debate from occurring within the workplace. As a result, the current
legal regime raises serious First Amendment concerns.
This explicit recognition of speech interests on both sides of the
equation builds on the work of First Amendment scholars who have
similarly reframed issues ranging from cross burning to pornography to

72. Logan, supra note 7, at 567 (emphasis added); see also James A. Gross, Worker Rights as
Human Rights: Wagner Act Values and Moral Choices, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 479, 483
(2002) (critiquing the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act, and arguing that “[t]he phrase
‘employer free speech’ concealed the real policy issue: the extent to which, if at all, employers
were to be permitted to exert economic power through speech in regard to employees’ choice of
and participation in unions”); Summers, supra note 7.
73. See Story, supra note 7, at 405-36.
74. See Getman, supra note 7; Larsen-Bright, supra note 7.
75. For example, Becker discusses limits on worker speech and union access during union
elections, Becker, supra note 7, at 557-69, but neither connects employer coercion to worker
silencing nor lays out an argument for how worker speech should be protected by the First
Amendment.
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campaign finance.76 Take, for example, the issue of cross burning
considered by the Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,77 and again, just
recently, in Virginia v. Black.78 While a traditional approach would see the
First Amendment only on the side of white supremacists being constrained
from engaging in racist expressive activity, recent scholarship argues that
free speech concerns exist on both sides of the equation: The private action
of cross burning not only limits the rights of African Americans to decide
where to live and to feel secure in their homes, it also interferes with the
speech rights of those citizens by discouraging them from participating in
the public debate, and by making them feel less secure when voicing their
views.79 As this Part demonstrates, speech is relevant on both sides of the
equation in union elections as well: Employer campaigning and other rules
governing workplace elections not only inhibit the right to organize but
have a silencing effect on workers and union messages.
A. The Silencing Effect of Employer Predictions and Veiled Threats
To understand fully how worker speech is silenced during the course of
union elections, we must first recognize how power is exercised in the
nonunion workplace. The union drive occurs in a context of employmentat-will, in which the employer has the power to change, unilaterally and
without notice, the employee’s compensation and the nature of an
employee’s job. An employer may even terminate the employee without
cause; the worker enjoys no general legal protection against arbitrary
discipline or discharge.80 In short, the employer structures and controls
every aspect of the employment relationship. As a result, the worker
76. See generally LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 9; Balkin, supra note 9; Sunstein, Free
Speech Now, supra note 9.
77. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). Note that the Court ultimately decided R.A.V. without addressing
the constitutionality of cross burning, by holding the statute unconstitutional on its face.
78. No. 01-1107 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2003) (holding that states may criminalize cross burning, as
long as prosecutors prove the act was intended as a threat and not as a form of symbolic
expression).
79. Notably, the Court in Virginia v. Black implicitly recognized the role of cross burning in
silencing African Americans and excluding them from the public debate, as it described how the
Ku Klux Klan used the tactic to terrorize freed blacks in order to prevent them from
“participat[ing] in the political process.” Id. slip op. at 6. For further discussion of cross burning
and the First Amendment’s democratic purposes, see FISS, supra note 12, at 111-20. Similar
arguments have been made in favor of regulation that puts caps on campaign contributions
(political speech) in order to enhance and equalize the public debate, or that regulates
pornography because it silences women. See generally LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 9. Some
of Justice Breyer’s recent opinions support the recognition that there can be speech interests on
both sides, particularly in the media and electoral context. See infra notes 202-210 and
accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A
Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J.
1357 (1983) (arguing that labor relations could be better governed through the private law of
contract and tort).
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experiences any employer statements against unionization and any
employer directives to remain silent from a position of relative
powerlessness.
In theory, the NLRA prohibits employers from threatening employees
about the repercussions of unionization or from promising benefit
enhancements as an inducement not to unionize; the Court, recognizing the
coercive power of employers, has found that irrespective of intent, such
statements will chill employees’ right to organize. The Court’s rule against
employer threats and promises holds that “an employer is free to
communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or
any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the
communications do not contain a threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.”81 However, under current interpretations of the law, employers are
allowed to make “objective” predictions. That is, they may frame what
would otherwise be an impermissible threat as a prediction about what
“might” happen if the employees were to unionize,82 even though a direct
threat and a prediction might have the same effect on the listener.
Employers are thus often able to circumvent the ban on threats by
rephrasing their statements as “possibilities.”
For example, without risking liability, an employer is free to “predict”
that its employees will lose time off;83 that unionization will create a
perception that the company is strike-prone and unreliable, leading to the
loss of customers;84 or that unionization could result in layoffs.85 The
employer may state that the company “might have to tighten up its
supervisory and personnel practices and reconsider existing, expensive
special benefits.”86 It can suggest that

81. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (citation omitted). Employers
also may not give benefit increases during elections. See NLRB v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405,
409 (1964) (holding that grants of benefits prior to an election are coercive, and noting that “[t]he
danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet
glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now conferred is
also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.”).
82. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 619 (stating that an employer may make predictions of a
possible plant closing after unionization if based on objective facts out of the employer’s control).
83. Gen. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 627, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (allowing employer
statements that workers would likely lose a holiday and two percent vacation bonus under the
terms of the union’s national agreement).
84. Id. at 633-34; see also Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1130, 1134-35 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (holding protected an employer’s prediction that unionization would increase costs,
risking the loss of business and consequent layoffs, notwithstanding the employer’s failure to
explain that such loss of projects was only a risk and not a certainty).
85. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 36 F.3d at 1140.
86. Paul Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1778 (1983) (citing J. LAWSON, HOW TO MEET THE
CHALLENGE OF THE UNION ORGANIZER § 6 (1968)).
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the union would likely demand hefty dues, fines, and assessments,
and might take the employees out on a long and costly strike with
no guarantee that there would be jobs at the end if replacements had
been hired in the meantime; if labor costs and labor unrest became
too great, the employer might have to relocate.87
Courts have even found that statements such as “I hope you guys are
ready to pack up and move to Mexico” are not implied threats of plant
closure.88 Such statements are all considered protected by the First
Amendment as codified in section 8(c).89 In addition, a threat made to
someone outside the bargaining unit (such as a supervisor) promising
retaliation against that third party is protected speech, as are threats made
against workers to a third party unless it can be shown that the employer
intended the workers to hear the speech.90 Similarly, employer speech
communicating that a third party (such as a customer or a union) will take
retaliatory action against employees is not illegal.91 In sum, under the free
speech provisions of the NLRA, “employers have virtually unlimited
opportunities to communicate aggressively with their employees during
union campaigns” and these “communications can and often do include
distortion, misinformation, threats, and intimidation.”92
Labor scholars have strenuously and extensively critiqued the
formalistic distinction between threats and predictions, and the lack of
prohibitions upon “third party” coercion.93 Yet the willingness of the Board
and the Supreme Court to allow employers such wide latitude in expression
is not surprising, given the one-sided free speech paradigm that this Note
has identified. Although the Court recognizes that employer speech can
have a coercive effect and can interfere with employees’ right to organize,
when the statutory right of collective bargaining is balanced against the
constitutional right to speak, it is commonsensical that speech prevail. In

87. Id.
88. NLRB v. Champion Labs., Inc., 99 F.3d 223, 228-29 (7th Cir. 1996).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000). In addition, employer speech is generally considered protected
even if it misrepresents and misleads, as long as it lacks any threat of reprisal or coercion. The
Board’s position on this issue has not been consistent, however. See COX ET AL., supra note 49, at
155-56.
90. See Story, supra note 7, at 432-33.
91. Id.
92. Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Election and First Contract
Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN
LABOR LAW 75, 82 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994).
93. Alan Story, for example, argues that, given the power wielded by the employer,
predictions have essentially the same coercive effect as threats, Story, supra note 7, at 422-32,
and, he contends, protection of third-party threats “completely ignore[s] power relations and
hierarchies of the workplace in an almost farcical way,” id. at 434-35. Thus, Story, along with
others, argues that employer predictions should not be protected under the First Amendment.
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fact, some scholars argue that there should be even fewer restrictions on
employer speech.94
The problem with this paradigm—Free Speech vs. Right To
Organize—is that it ignores the fact that there are speech interests on both
sides of the equation and fails to recognize that employer speech has a
silencing effect. The very coercion that the Court, the Board, and academics
recognize is not just a coercion to stop organizing, but a coercion to be
silent. Given the conditions in which the idea of joining a union is
circulated—the at-will employment relationship in which workers know
they can be fired without cause—employer speech makes it impossible for
workers to participate freely and fully in the discussion, due to fear of
retaliation.95 As they have been repeatedly told by their employer, to
express pro-union views and act upon them might lead to a multitude of
negative consequences. Fully aware of their precarious position, the
workers will understandably choose to refrain from expressing dissenting,
pro-union speech.
B. Inadequate Penalties and Enforcement Violate Workers’
Freedom of Speech
The silencing effect of predictions and other protected employer speech
is compounded by the fact that the law does not adequately protect
employees who speak freely in support of a union. While the law formally
protects workers from being disciplined or fired on the basis of their union
activity, the Court has held that “[t]he Act does not interfere with the
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to
discharge them.”96 The employer maintains the authority to terminate
employees in the course of union campaigns “for other reasons
than . . . intimidation and coercion,”97 and the burden of proving that the
action was retaliatory is on the plaintiff.98

94. For the argument that more employer speech should be allowed, see Getman, supra note
7; and Larsen-Bright, supra note 7.
95. Employer speech also normatively demands silence: By opposing unionization, the
employer demands that workers should not have the power to set jointly the terms and conditions
of work, and, therefore, that workers should be silent in the workplace. For further discussion, see
infra Subsection III.B.1. My description of these two types of silencing draws from OWEN M.
FISS, Freedom and Feminism, in LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 9, at 67, 85-86. See also FISS,
supra note 2, at 5-26 (discussing the silencing effect of some forms of speech). For an argument
that the law of the workplace, because of employment-at-will, does not guarantee due process
rights and thus fails to protect free speech generally, see Estlund, supra note 15.
96. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
97. Id. at 46.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000) (stating that an employee subjected to an unfair labor practice
has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer discriminated
against her on the basis of her union activity).
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Moreover, an employee has no private cause of action to challenge her
discipline or termination; she may file a charge with the Board, but the
Board has discretion over whether or not to prosecute a complaint.99 If the
Board does prosecute, and an employer is found to have fired a worker in
violation of the law, such an employer faces no punitive damages100 and
may even offset from the back-pay award any wages earned by the worker
in the interim.101 In addition to the minimal penalties imposed on employers
who illegally terminate workers for their union speech, there are significant
delays between when a worker files an unfair labor practice charge and
when she can hope to get an enforceable court order. The case goes through
a four-stage process, averaging three years to complete.102
Because penalties for retaliation against union activity are so limited
and enforcement is so weak, employers are often not dissuaded from
violating the law.103 The number of workers who suffer reprisals for union
activity each year has increased dramatically over the last half-century.104
The data suggest that employers have become increasingly willing to
suppress union speech in violation of the federal statute. In recent years,
thousands of employees per year have been ordered reinstated as a result of
findings that they were discharged on the basis of protected activity, such as
solicitation of union support, discussions with coworkers about
unionization, and other forms of expressive activity.105 The incidence of
illegal firings increased from one in every twenty union elections in the
1950s, to one in every four elections in the 1990s.106 According to one

99. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 11819 (1987).
100. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970) (finding that an examiner could not
award punitive damages even for a repeat offender).
101. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198-200 (1941); Retailer Delivery
Sys., Inc., 292 N.L.R.B. 121, 125 (1988). In 1990, the average back-pay award amounted to
$2749 per discharge, FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 11, at 69, an amount far too small to
serve as a disincentive. Furthermore, as the federal commission established to evaluate the status
of worker-management relations noted, there are stiffer sanctions available to employees whose
rights are violated under most other federal employment laws including the Civil Rights Act, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as
under state employment laws. Under these federal and state laws, the employer is generally liable
for financial and psychological harms to the victims, punitive damages for willful misconduct, and
attorney’s fees of victorious plaintiffs. Id. at 70.
102. FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 11, at 69. While it takes an average of three years
before an employer is legally obligated to reinstate an employee who has been discharged in
violation of the Act, there can be earlier disposition of a charge if there is voluntary agreement
between the parties. Id.
103. Weiler, supra note 86, at 1789-90. Significant case studies support this conclusion.
Human Rights Watch, documenting widespread violations of the law, found that “freedom of
association is a right under severe, often buckling pressure when workers in the United States try
to exercise it.” See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE 7 (2000). See generally id.
104. FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 11, at 67-68, 81-83.
105. Id. at 67, 81.
106. Id. at 68.
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scholar, “Union organizing seems to be the most harshly suppressed and
frequently adjudicated of all forms of protected workplace speech.”107
Given these factors, it is no wonder that most employees believe that
pro-union activity results in serious reprisals.108 In a 1991 survey, 79
percent of workers polled agreed that it was either “very” likely or
“somewhat” likely “that non union workers ‘will get fired if they try to
organize a union.’”109 Another study found that “70 percent of employees
believe that ‘corporations sometimes harass, intimidate, or fire employees
who openly speak up for a union.’”110 The data suggest that employees are
acutely aware of the cost of speaking up for a union against management
wishes. Thus, it is only logical that a worker who already believes that prounion speech leads to termination, and who then hears carefully phrased
predictions or even outright threats from her employer, would suppress her
pro-union speech. Significant empirical work demonstrates that employer
campaigning combined with weak enforcement of the statutory right to
organize inhibits unionization efforts.111 Moreover, case studies and
interviews with workers performed by human rights advocates support the
intuition that exposure to employers’ predictions/threats, combined with
fear of retaliation, causes workers to constrain their own speech: Employees
consistently describe being silenced due to fear.112

107. Estlund, supra note 15, at 122.
108. Id. at 121.
109. Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a
Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 13, 29 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION]; see also FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 11, at 72 (citing and discussing
the same study).
110. Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: Employee Representation in the Eyes of the
Law, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 109, at 81, 85.
111. Although there is no consensus among empiricists about whether employer speech, in
and of itself, unfairly coerces workers or affects the outcome of an election, there is little dispute
that when employer anti-union campaigning is combined with weak enforcement against
retaliation, workers’ ability to organize is drastically reduced. While an early study by Jack
Getman concluded that what employers say during an election campaign—including threats,
misrepresentations, and promises of benefit improvements—rarely determines or even influences
the vote, JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY
(1976), many subsequent studies conclude differently, see, e.g., Bronfenbrenner, supra note 92;
Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing
Drives, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 351, 362 (1990). Other scholarship attacks Getman’s study
on theoretical grounds. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 86, at 1782-86. For further examples of
scholarship challenging Getman’s study, see sources cited in Getman, supra note 7, at 10 n.36.
For a discussion of the literature, see Story, supra note 7, at 363-64.
112. A nursing-home worker, for example, told Human Rights Watch, “After the firings
everybody clammed up. . . . They were afraid . . . . They’re afraid of losing their jobs.” HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103, at 82. A food-processing worker explained how he altered his
pro-union speech due to fear of his employer: “[Management] asked me if I signed a card. I said
yes but that I was going to vote against the union.” Id. at 102; see also YALE LAW SCH. RIGHT TO
ORGANIZE MONITORING COMM., WHEN BAD LABOR RELATIONS GO GOOD: A ROADMAP FOR
LABOR PEACE AT YALE 35-36 & nn.180-89 (2002), at http://islandia.law.yale.edu/wrp/ (finding
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C. Compulsion To Listen and Inability To Speak
The degree to which worker speech is silenced and pro-union messages
are excluded during union organizing drives becomes even clearer upon
examination of the rest of the representation election doctrine. Under the
law, not only are enforcement mechanisms inadequate and employers
permitted wide latitude in making predictions about the negative
consequences of unionization, but they are also allowed to compel
employees to listen to such speech through mandatory “captive audience”
meetings, they are permitted to silence workers who offer dissenting
opinions during these forced encounters, and they can place restrictions on
when and where employees engage in pro-union speech.
According to the Supreme Court, employers may mandate that
employees attend anti-union meetings on work time.113 These anti-union
meetings can take the form of sessions in which there are one or more
supervisors and just one worker, as well as mass assemblies.114 Attendance
at captive audience meetings is compelled: Employees must listen to antiunion speeches or face termination.115 Captive audience speeches were
initially held to be unlawfully coercive, but were subsequently legalized
with passage of the free speech amendment to the NLRA.116 They are now
considered to be integral to the employer’s right to freedom of speech, even
though in most other contexts there is no First Amendment right to speak to
a captive audience.117
widespread intimidation and silencing of workers attempting to organize at Yale-New Haven
Hospital and at Yale University).
113. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357 (1958). During the twenty-fourhour period immediately preceding an election, pro- or anti-union group meetings on company
time are not allowed. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953).
114. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103 (finding systemic use of the “captive
audience” meeting, including individual and mass meetings).
115. Remarkably, the Board has ruled that employees can be terminated for leaving such
meetings without permission. Litton Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968).
116. Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board ruled that employers could not compel
employees to listen to anti-union speeches. Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 804 (1946),
enforced as modified, 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). It explained that because the employer wielded
its “economic power” to hold an employee audience captive and because the employees were not
“free to determine whether or not to receive” the employer’s information, the employer committed
an unfair labor practice. Id. at 805. The Board noted that it was not limiting the expression of
opinion but only the compulsion to listen, which was not “an inseparable part of . . . speech.” Id.
Following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, and only two years after Clark Bros., the
Board reversed course and approved the use of employer captive audience speeches. The decision
was based on an interpretation of the Act. The Board wrote that the “language . . . and its
legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Bros. case no longer exists.”
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948). For further discussion, see Becker, supra
note 7, at 557-58.
117. The Board’s determination that it could no longer proscribe captive audience meetings
because of the free speech provision of the NLRA (a provision the Supreme Court held to be a
mere codification of the First Amendment in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617
(1969)) is inconsistent with First Amendment doctrine in other contexts. Generally speaking, the
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The captive audience doctrine unfairly forces workers to listen to
employer speech, in ways inconsistent with other areas of First Amendment
law. Moreover, the doctrine explicitly allows employers to silence workers
and suppress the message of pro-union workers. The employer can legally
stifle discussion within the meetings, controlling which viewpoints are
aired. For example, the Board has ruled that employers may preemptively
exclude union supporters from meetings,118 and may eject vocal pro-union
workers who deliberately speak out once meetings have begun.119
Employers may also terminate employees for insubordination if they evince
a concerted plan to speak out during meetings,120 or if they ask pro-union
questions about the information presented, in violation of a “no question”
rule.121 The law does not give pro-union employees the right to
counterbalance employers’ anti-union speech. As the Eighth Circuit has
made clear, there is no equal speech right for workers: Required anti-union
meetings are not forums in which “employees must be placed in the status
of equals in dealing with management.”122
These cases vividly illustrate how the Board and the courts fail to
recognize that speech interests exist on both sides of the equation. Worker
rights are not considered in terms of free speech. Instead, the rulings
emphasize the employer’s freedom of speech and its right to control the
workplace, balanced against the worker’s right to organize. For example, in
Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, a pro-union employee was discharged for
insubordination arising out of an attempt to speak during a captive audience
meeting.123 The discharge was upheld by the court, in part because of the
employer’s right to free speech and without mention of the worker’s
corresponding speech right: “[The plant manager’s] talk was clearly
protected by the free speech provisions of the Act and conceded so to be by
Court has held that laws banning speeches to captive audiences do not violate the First
Amendment. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (upholding a ban on targeted
residential picketing because of the resident’s captivity in her home); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) (upholding a ban on targeted political advertising in buses
because the commuters are a captive audience). The decision that the NLRB could not prohibit
captive audience meetings because of the “free speech provision” seems even stranger given the
Court’s holding in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), that the FCC could prohibit
certain types of offensive speech on the airwaves because persons receiving broadcasts in their
homes are in the position of a captive audience. Whereas listeners in their homes can turn off the
radio, workers face termination if they leave captive audience meetings without permission.
118. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980).
119. Hicks Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 814 (1967).
120. J.P. Stevens & Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 850, 850 (1975); see also Boaz Spinning Co. v.
NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that an employer did not commit an unfair
labor practice by discharging an employee who spoke out at a captive audience meeting in
violation of the employer’s order to remain silent).
121. NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prods. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 8-11 (8th Cir. 1974) (overruling the
Board’s judgment that a worker who spoke out in a union meeting and was subsequently
terminated for insubordination should be reinstated).
122. Id. at 11.
123. 395 F.2d 512.
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the Board.”124 In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit claimed to be privileging the
rights of employers to speak and to control their workplaces over the
statutory right of workers to organize. But in sanctioning the termination of
a worker for speaking out during a captive audience meeting, the court was
also effectively privileging employer rights over worker speech rights.
Essentially, the court ruled that the employer’s right to speak and maintain
order outweighed the right of the employee to speak.
The ability of employers to stifle pro-union messages and the failure of
courts to protect worker speech interests under the First Amendment go
beyond the captive audience meeting. Generally speaking, employees are
allowed to discuss unionization while at work, but employers can place
restrictions on that right if they “can demonstrate that a restriction is
necessary to maintain production or discipline.”125 Moreover, under
Republic Aviation Corp., the employer can forbid employees from
distributing union literature and soliciting coworkers to join the union in
working areas of the plant and on work time, as long as the employer places
identical restrictions on all forms of solicitation.126 Again, the Court
balances the rights of employers against workers’ right to organize, rather
than considering workers’ speech rights.127
By allowing employers to compel workers to listen, and by permitting
employers to actively restrict pro-union messages, Congress, the Board, and
courts sanction the silencing of worker and union speech. Moreover, they
limit the existence of meaningful debate among workers on the question of
unionization. Essentially, the employer may so dominate discussion in the
workplace that the employees hear only its message.

124. Id. at 515; see also Prescott Indus. Prods. Co., 500 F.2d at 10 (“Where . . . an
employee’s pro-union activity is asserted to have interfered with management’s right to maintain
order and respect and its right to deliver an anti-union speech, the Board must engage in what we
have described as a ‘balancing process.’ The employees’ rights [to engage in concerted activity]
are to be weighed against the interests of management in the pursuit of its lawful objectives.”
(citations omitted)); cf. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. v. NLRB, 200 F.3d 230, 243
(5th Cir. 1999) (finding a dismissal for speaking out illegal, but still failing to consider workers’
rights in terms of free speech: “[T]he employee’s right to engage in concerted activity permits
some leeway for impulsive behavior, which must be balanced against the employer’s right to
maintain order and respect.”).
125. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (citing Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945)).
126. See 324 U.S. at 803 n.10 (“Working time is for work. It is therefore within the province
of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working
hours.” (citation omitted)). Employees may, however, engage in such activity in their off-time in
nonworking areas of the workplace, as long as there are no special circumstances making the rule
“necessary to maintain production or discipline.” Id. at 804 n.10 (citation omitted). Similarly,
employees may wear union insignia as long as other insignia are allowed and there are no special
circumstances making all such insignia impermissible. See id. at 802 n.7.
127. See, e.g., id. at 797-98.
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D. Union Access and Limits on Debate
The potential for vigorous and meaningful debate within the workplace
is further limited because the law allows employers to exclude union
organizers from the workplace. The Supreme Court standard was first
articulated in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.:
[A]n employer may validly post his property against nonemployee
distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union
through other available channels of communication will enable it to
reach the employees with its message and if the employer’s notice
or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other
distribution.128
The NLRB and federal appeals courts have interpreted this standard to
preclude access of union organizers to almost all workplaces, except when
workers live on company property.129 Recently, in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
the Supreme Court overturned a Board ruling granting access to a parking
lot and made clear that nonemployee union organizers virtually never have
the right to enter private property to communicate with unorganized
employees.130
The limits on union access and on-site solicitation continue even when
the employer has violated its own solicitation rules. In Livingston Shirt
Co.,131 decided a few years after the free speech amendment was enacted,
the Board departed from earlier holdings and held that employers were
allowed to hold captive audience meetings in violation of their own nosolicitation rules without allowing union organizers comparable rights to
communicate with employees during work time.132 Ironically, while
128. 351 U.S. at 112.
129. See, e.g., Dexter Thread Mills, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 543 (1972) (forbidding access to an
employer’s parking lot even though the property was accessible only by means of a public
highway with a forty-mile-per-hour speed limit); cf. NLRB v. S&H Grossinger’s Inc., 372 F.2d 26
(2d Cir. 1967) (involving a mountain resort and workers who lived on company property); NLRB
v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948) (involving logging camps and
workers who lived on company property); Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972)
(involving mining camps and workers who lived on company property).
130. 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992) (“Because the employees do not reside on Lechmere’s
property, they are presumptively not ‘beyond the reach’ of the union’s message.” (citing Babcock
& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 113)). Notably, the Court in Lechmere, citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976), emphasized that the union organizers had no First Amendment claim and that its
determination that there could be a narrow exception to the ban on entry when workers live on
company property rested only on the workers’ right to organize under section 7 of the NLRB.
Lechmere, Inc., 502 U.S. at 533-34. For a discussion of how realization of the First Amendment’s
democratic aims would both permit and require a different outcome, see infra Part IV.
131. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
132. Id. at 409 (“We rule therefore that . . . an employer does not commit an unfair labor
practice if he makes a preelection speech on company time and premises to his employees and
denies the union’s request for an opportunity to reply.”).
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denying union organizers speech rights, the Board framed its ruling as a
victory for the principle of free speech. The Board wrote, “If the privilege
of free speech is to be given real meaning, it cannot be qualified by grafting
upon it conditions which are tantamount to negation.”133 In NLRB v. United
Steelworkers (Avondale), the Supreme Court subsequently upheld the
NLRB’s affirmation of employer free speech and denial of equal time for
union organizers, even when a company is in violation of its own policies
against solicitation, and even where employer solicitation is coercive and
unlawful.134 Thus, the Court specifically held that the right of the union to
communicate was not equal to that of the employer.135
By virtue of Republic Aviation, Avondale, and Lechmere, both the
union’s ability to communicate with workers and the ability of workers to
communicate with one another are quite limited. Employees may distribute
written information about the union and solicit their coworkers’
participation only during their nonworking time and in nonworking areas,
and paid union organizers have access to workers only in the most
particular of circumstances, such as when workers live on company
property. Otherwise, they are relegated to whatever public property is
closest to the facility. In a landscape increasingly defined by highways and
strip malls, this right to communicate is unequal if not illusory.136
Thus, the broad protection of employer speech and the extensive power
of employers to force workers to listen to anti-union campaigning exist in a
context where worker and union speech are severely constrained. When
employer predictions and the inadequate protections against retaliation are
combined with the rest of the representation election doctrine, the silencing
effect is compounded. In sum, Congress, the Board, and the courts have
created and enforced a doctrine that enshrines the right of management to
campaign against the union, while silencing worker speech and excluding
pro-union messages. In so doing, the state has disregarded the First
Amendment’s goal of creating free and full debate.

133. Id. at 406.
134. 357 U.S. 357, 362-64 (1958).
135. Id. at 364. The Court explained:
[T]he Taft Hartley Act does not command that labor organizations as a matter of
abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of every possible means of
reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that they are entitled to use a medium of
communication simply because the employer is using it.
Id.
136. In interviews with human rights advocates, workers point out that the debate within the
workplace is skewed. As the food-processing worker told Human Rights Watch, “It would be a lot
fairer if the union could come in and talk to us. The company has a big advantage, making people
come to meetings and showing videos. A lot of people don’t come to union meetings. They’re
scared the company will know.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 103, at 102.
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III. UNION ELECTIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PURPOSES OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Thus far, this Note has sought to reframe the debate over the regulation
of speech within workplace representation elections as Speech vs. Speech,
rather than Employer Speech vs. Workers’ Right To Organize. In
highlighting the coercive impact of employer speech, I have not argued that
anti-union campaigning is simply coercion and not speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment.137 Rather, I have demonstrated how the
current regime suppresses worker speech and limits debate. Before
examining what a regime that adequately considers workers’ speech rights
might look like (and whether the First Amendment merely permits or
actually requires such changes), it is worth spending a moment looking in
more detail at the function of the First Amendment within the Constitution
and the American system of government. An examination of the First
Amendment’s fundamental purpose—to facilitate democracy and collective
self-governance—reveals the weakness of the Court’s approach and
demonstrates the importance of a doctrine that recognizes the speech rights
of workers and allows union messages to be heard. That is, the Court’s
failure to protect worker speech and union messages ultimately contravenes
the purposes of the First Amendment, not only within the workplace but
also in society more broadly.
A. Uninhibited, Robust and Wide-Open Debate and the Critique of the
Autonomy Approach
One of the most important themes of First Amendment doctrine has
been that the Amendment functions “as the guardian of our democracy.”138
Indeed, there is considerable support among scholars across the political
spectrum for the notion that the purpose of the First Amendment is to
enable self-governance.139 As Owen Fiss explains, “The law’s intention is
137. Cf. Story, supra note 7, at 405-36 (arguing that employer campaigning is not speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment because it is coercive).
138. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982); see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147, 161 (1939). But see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the First Amendment’s role in “the autonomous control over the development and
expression of one’s intellect, interests, tastes, and personality” (emphasis omitted)).
139. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208-09; Post, supra note 9, at 111415; see also sources cited supra note 9. That the purpose of the First Amendment is to enable selfgovernance was most famously articulated by Alexander Meiklejohn. See generally MEIKLEJOHN,
supra note 9. Note, however, that even scholars who agree on the democratic purposes of the First
Amendment draw very different conclusions about what speech should be protected. Bork, for
example, requires speech “to deal explicitly, specifically and directly with politics and
government.” Bork, supra, at 26. Other scholars focus on self-actualization as another goal of the
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to broaden the terms of public discussion as a way of enabling common
citizens to become aware of the issues before them and of the arguments on
all sides and thus to pursue their ends fully and freely.”140 Scholars
performing a historical, textual, and structural analysis of the First
Amendment support this view.141 The free speech guarantee appears as part
of a legal instrument largely concerned with establishing the structure of
government.
Yet, despite broad consensus on the purpose of the First Amendment,
scholars diverge on how best to achieve the goal of enabling selfgovernance—how to determine which speech to protect. Some argue that
the best approach is to protect the individual speaker’s autonomy from
government incursion.142 As discussed previously, the Court’s approach has
been in line with this “autonomy” theory of the First Amendment:
Increasingly over time, the Court has protected the individual speaker from
the state.143 The period from World War I until the early 1970s witnessed a
series of profound debates about the role of dissent in society. For civil
libertarians, the premise was that “the state was the natural enemy of
freedom. It was the state that was trying to silence the individual speaker,
and it was the state that had to be curbed.”144 During this period, between
Schenk145 in 1919 and Brandenberg146 in 1969, the Court expanded
protections for the dissenter, creating what Harry Kalven termed a “worthy
tradition.”147 This body of doctrine can be understood as protecting the
“street corner speaker” from being silenced by the state,148 and the rule that
emerged from the period was, in its most basic form, a rule against content
regulation: The state cannot silence someone just because it does not like
what is being said.149
Building on the work of Alexander Meiklejohn, democratic First
Amendment scholars have challenged the Court’s focus on the individual
First Amendment. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 879-81 (1963).
140. FISS, supra note 2, at 3.
141. For such a reading of the First Amendment, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 20-21 (1998) (“[The First Amendment] sounds in structure and focuses (at least in part)
on the representational linkage between Congress and its constituents. On this account, the First
Amendment reaffirms the structural role of free speech and a free press in a working
democracy.”); and id. at 20-26.
142. See, e.g., Post, supra note 9, at 1120 (“[T]he value of individual autonomy is inseparable
from the very aspiration for self-government . . . .”). See generally KALVEN, supra note 60, at
119-236 (celebrating the Court’s move over time to protecting the autonomous speaker from state
incursion).
143. FISS, Social Structure, supra note 19, at 12; FISS, supra note 70, at 37.
144. FISS, supra note 2, at 2.
145. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
146. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
147. KALVEN, supra note 60.
148. FISS, supra note 19, at 12.
149. See id.
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speaker’s autonomy, arguing that the protection of the street corner speaker
from government interference does not necessarily achieve the First
Amendment’s purpose of safeguarding the democratic system.150 These
scholars acknowledge that the Court’s focus on self-expression, and its
attempt to guard against state repression, have served to protect the
marginal political dissenter and, therefore, have been essential and valuable
parts of the American tradition.151 Yet, they argue, the approach fails to
recognize how the freedom to speak depends upon the resources at one’s
disposal and how, given the distribution of political and economic power in
society, freedom from state intervention does not always result in a rich
public debate.152 Autonomy might enhance public debate and promote
collective self-determination in a Jeffersonian democracy, “where the
dominant social unit is the individual and power is distributed equally.”153
But it does not have the same effect in a modern society characterized by
gross disparities of power, wealth, and access to information.154
In short, democratic free speech scholars argue that, in order to fulfill
the purposes of the First Amendment, the Court’s focus should not be on
protecting the individual street corner speaker from the state. Rather, it
should be on enriching public debate and making sure that all views are
heard. Under this view,
[t]he state might also have the right to stop the general advocacy of
an idea when that advocacy has the effect of interfering with the
speech rights of others. In that instance, the state ban on speech
does not restrict or impoverish public debate, but paradoxically
enough, broadens it, for it allows all voices to be heard. The state
acts not as a censor, but rather as a parliamentarian, requiring some
to shut up so others can speak.155

150. Meiklejohn criticizes Justice Holmes and the focus on autonomy for
rob[bing] the amendment of its essential meaning—the meaning of our common
agreement that, working together as a body politic, we will be our own rulers. That
meaning is the highest insight which men have reached in their search for political
freedom. And Mr. Holmes—at least in his “clear and present danger” thinking—misses
it.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9, at 75.
151. Jack Balkin urges us to remember that “for most of America’s history, protecting free
speech has helped marginalized or unpopular groups to gain political power and influence. The
first amendment normally has been the friend of left wing values . . . .” Balkin, supra note 9, at
383; see also FISS, Social Structure, supra note 19, at 13 (“A body of doctrine that fully protects
the street corner speaker is indeed an accomplishment of some note . . . .”).
152. See, e.g., FISS, Social Structure, supra note 19, at 10; Balkin, supra note 9, at 379
(noting that in our society, “the power of persons to put their messages across loudly and
repeatedly because of their economic power and influence effectively silences other, excluded and
marginalized voices”).
153. FISS, supra note 70, at 37.
154. Id.
155. FISS, supra note 95, at 84-85.
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The democratic theory of the First Amendment has gained explicit
support from the Court. Most famously, Justice Brennan wrote in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan that democracy and popular sovereignty require a
public debate that is “uninhibited, robust and wide-open.”156 To support the
theory, democratic scholars also point to Justice Brandeis’s concurrence in
Whitney v. California157 and the Court’s opinion in Associated Press v.
United States.158 These decisions, which form the basis for the democratic
theory of the First Amendment, have received new attention in several
recent concurring opinions of Justice Breyer.159 Critically, Breyer has
recognized that there can be speech on both sides of the legal equation and
that regulation imposing limited restrictions on particular speech is
permissible if such governmental policy enhances public discussion.
B. Workplace Speech, Unions, and the Robustness of Political Debate in
Society at Large
The Court’s approach to speech in the workplace representation
election, outlined in Parts I and II, illustrates the problem with an
“autonomy” approach to free speech: By focusing exclusively on the
expressive interests of the employer and on government (NLRB) limits on
such expression, the Court has allowed workers to be silenced and union
views to be excluded. As demonstrated in Part II, the autonomy approach
has failed to ensure any meaningful right of free speech for workers and has
failed to enable an “uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate” within the
workplace. Rather, it has allowed employees to be routinely silenced and
pro-union messages to be excluded. Congress through the Taft-Hartley Act,
and the Board and courts through their enforcement capacities, have
legitimated and maintained a system in which worker speech and union
messages are suppressed.
Critics of this Note might argue that to give more deference to workers
and union speech interests would unduly trammel the speech, property, and
managerial rights of employers. This Section responds to such objections
by arguing that worker speech and union messages must be given more
weight relative to employer’s property and managerial interests, and must
be better balanced with employer speech because of their particular import
for the First Amendment’s aim of safeguarding democracy.

156. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
157. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won our
independence . . . believed that . . . public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government.”).
158. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
159. See infra notes 202-210 and accompanying text.
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1. Inside the Workplace
For the most part, First Amendment scholars have not considered the
workplace generally, and the union election specifically, to be a particularly
important area for free speech.160 Some even treat the workplace as a
nonpublic sphere in which government regulation of speech is not
problematic.161 This Note, however, rejects the notion that the site where
Americans spend much of their waking lives is or can ever be outside the
domain of public discourse. In fact, the workplace is central to citizenship,
identity, and community.162 It is not merely a marginal part of the general
domain of public discourse; it serves important functions within the larger
system of freedom of expression.163 For many citizens, particularly the vast
majority who are not political activists, the workplace is a main site of
discussion about political and social issues in addition to matters of
individual personal significance.164 Rather than being outside the domain of
public discourse, the workplace is a critical locus in which speech rights are
exercised and in which the public debate is formed. This is not to argue that
there cannot or should not be any restrictions on what workers (or
employers) can say while at work, only that the workplace cannot be
considered irrelevant to public discourse. While the Court has not offered a
coherent theory of freedom of speech within the workplace, it has
recognized that employee speech in the workplace should not be wholly
beyond the reach of the First Amendment.165
Not only is speech within the workplace generally worthy of First
Amendment protection, a democratic theory of the First Amendment
160. To the degree that First Amendment scholars do examine the issues of labor speech and
speech in the workplace, they tend to focus on protection of public-employee grievances;
regulation of harassing speech; and the status of workers’ collective action, such as boycotts and
pickets. See sources cited supra note 10.
161. For example, Robert Post goes so far as to define the workplace as clearly outside the
domain of public discourse, asserting that “an image of dialogue among autonomous selfgoverning citizens would be patently out of place” in the workplace. Robert C. Post, Racist
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 289 (1991). For a
provocative discussion of Post and other academics who treat the workplace as lying outside the
realm of public discourse, and of the few commentators who have challenged such conceptions,
see Estlund, supra note 10, at 719-20 nn.139-48.
162. For a general discussion of the centrality of work to citizenship, identity, and
community, see Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
163. See Estlund, supra note 10, at 694, 717-18 (arguing that the workplace is an institution
where citizens relate with their fellow citizens; form and exchange opinions about how the
workplace is regulated; and gain, or could gain, experience with self-governance). Estlund puts
forth a theory in which “the core domain of public discourse is surrounded by satellite domains of
discourse within intermediate institutions such as the workplace.” Id. at 720.
164. KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES
OF SPEECH 83 (1995); Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 515 (1991).
165. For a discussion of how the Court has treated employee speech within the workplace
generally, see Estlund, supra note 10, at 708-11.
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demands that workplace speech pertaining to unionization be given
particular protection, for several reasons. First, unionization-related speech
involves questions of collective self-determination. By deciding whether or
not to unionize, workers are deciding whether to establish a representative
system of governance at work; they are determining how power should be
distributed both in their workplace and in the economy. Because the
decision about governance and power is fundamentally political, and
because it is a democratic decision usually made by voting, related speech
should be protected. After all, the First Amendment protects speech because
speech is an “instrument of collective self-determination.”166 Second,
unionization gives workers the ability to be heard within the workplace and,
therefore, should be seen as speech-enhancing. That is, as employees-atwill, without a collective organization, workers’ speech is often
inconsequential; it can be disregarded by the employer, leaving employees
with no legal or practical recourse. In contrast, unionized employees have a
mechanism to make their voices heard through the practice of collective
bargaining and collective action. Third, unionization enables greater speech
of all kinds within the workplace because unionized workers, unlike
employees-at-will, generally cannot be terminated without just cause.167
Their job protection and due process rights make them much more likely to
speak freely, whether as whistle-blowers or as open critics of their
employers.168
2. Outside the Workplace
Perhaps even more important, at least from the democratic perspective,
is that the silencing of worker and union speech during the course of union
elections does not just limit speech within the workplace on the question of
collective self-determination, but it also limits the robustness of public
debate outside the workplace. There are two components to this claim.
First, the ability of employers to suppress speech and to thwart unionization
efforts means that Americans spend much of their waking lives without any
meaningful free speech or democratic participation rights. This limits their
experience with collective self-governance—the focus of the First
Amendment—and tends to decrease their participation in public life and
voting. Second, it narrows the scope of political debate in society: Without
the existence of powerful worker organizations, corporate interests
increasingly dominate public debate, and the scope of political speech in

166. FISS, Social Structure, supra note 19, at 13.
167. See Estlund, supra note 15. Because this issue is well-examined by Estlund, I will not
discuss it in any depth.
168. Id.
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American society, as well as the health of American democracy, is
compromised.
While the link between unionization and the First Amendment’s goal of
safeguarding the democratic system is largely unexplored, the connection
between unionization and democracy is not a new theory. Indeed, the
NLRA itself was born out of a belief in the connection between
participation rights at work and democratic self-governance.169 During the
debates over the Wagner Act, themes of democracy, self-government, and
citizenship were repeatedly offered as justifications for the Act.170 Senator
Wagner emphasized the connection between unionization and democracy,
stating that the “struggle for a voice in industry through the process of
collective bargaining is at the heart of the struggle for the preservation of
political as well as economic democracy in America,” and positing that if
people “know the dignity of freedom and self-expression in their daily
lives . . . they will never bow to tyranny in any quarter of their national
life.”171 The AFL later defended the Wagner Act’s constitutionality on the
ground that it contributed to democracy by invoking Article IV, Section 4’s
guarantee that every state be granted a republican form of government: The
counsel for the AFL told Congress that “the preservation of industrial
democracy [was] essential to the preservation of a republican form of
government.”172
Political theorists, most famously Carol Pateman, have given
theoretical and empirical support to the claim made by the Act’s historical
defenders. Workers who have a meaningful role in decisionmaking at work
develop a sense of political efficacy that may make them more informed
and active citizens in the project of self-governance.173 As de Tocqueville

169. See Becker, supra note 7, at 503-04. In labor’s view, the legislation was also grounded
in the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery and its implicit promise of free labor. See
generally Pope, supra note 22 (describing and critiquing the decision of progressive lawyers and
legislators who decided to defend the NLRA using the Commerce Clause, rather than a Thirteenth
Amendment human rights theory as advocated by the labor movement).
170. Becker, supra note 7, at 503. Becker argues that the model of political democracy
provided the framers of the law with powerful images but that the conception has subverted
labor’s right to representation, “for it rests on a fiction of equality between unions and employers
as candidates vying in the electoral arena.” Id. at 497.
171. The Ideal Industrial State—as Wagner Sees It, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1937, § 6
(Magazine), at 8, 23.
172. To Create a National Labor Board: Hearing on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. on
Education and Labor, 73d Cong. 51 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 27, 139 (1959) (statement of William Green,
President, AFL).
173. CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970). Pateman
writes:
[I]t is only if the individual has the opportunity directly to participate in decision
making and choose representatives in the alternative areas that, under modern
conditions, he can hope to have any real control over the course of his life or the
development of the environment in which he lives.
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emphasized over a century ago, collective membership organizations serve
as schools for democracy.174 In particular, aside from elected bodies, unions
are some of the most formally democratic institutions in American society,
and they therefore provide to workers an important personal experience
with representative structures and democratic participation.175 Unions
historically have fostered political participation among their members, and
as they and other membership organizations have become a weaker force in
the United States, involvement in civic life and electoral politics has
declined.176
By no means is unionization the sole method by which workers can
learn the values of democracy, nor is it the only means by which there can
be participation at work. However, collective bargaining was a right created
for the express purpose of building democracy and encouraging civic
participation. Even those who doubt the theories of such political scientists
as Pateman would acknowledge that daily experience with freedom of
speech and representative structures is far more closely tied to democracy
and participation in electoral politics than are the art and literature that
Meiklejohn conceded were protected by the First Amendment as necessary
to voting.177 If the project of the First Amendment is to protect speech in
Id. at 110; see also Thomas C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV 229, 230
(1993) (“[I]t is the small associations and mediating bodies, where society is realized, that act as
the seedbeds for the civic virtues. For it is in them that we learn the habits necessary to sustain
democratic political life.”). There is also a growing literature supporting both the instrumental and
intrinsic value of “employee voice” in workplace governance. See Estlund, supra note 10, at 723.
174. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 517 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., Perennial Classics 2000) (1835) (“In democratic countries knowledge of how to
combine is the mother of all other forms of knowledge; on its progress depends that of all the
others. . . . If men are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the art of association must
develop and improve among them.”).
175. There is no question that American unions have, at times, failed to embody the
democratic vision to which the idea of representation at work aspires. For a law reform argument
urging greater union democracy, see Clyde W. Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State:
Perspectives from Landrum-Griffin, 43 MD. L. REV. 93 (1984). However, just as failures of
political democratic systems do not make us reject the notion of democracy, examples of
undemocratic unions should not lead us to reject the project of representational democracy at
work. Even when labor unions fall short of their democratic potential, they offer workers greater
participation rights than does employment-at-will.
176. ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 31-32, 53, 80-82 (2000) (discussing the decline of
political participation in America and the concomitant decline of membership in workplace
organizations); see also Theda Skoçpol, Advocates Without Members: The Recent Transformation
of American Civic Life, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 461, 462, 498-506
(Theda Skoçpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., 1999) [hereinafter CIVIC ENGAGEMENT] (arguing that
“new civic America [is] largely run by advocates and managers without members,” and that this
shift away from membership organizations results in greater power and social leverage for elite
Americans); Theda Skoçpol et al., A Nation of Organizers: The Institutional Origins of Civic
Voluntarism in the United States, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 527 (2000) (arguing that translocal
federations, such as federated labor organizations, have historically been central to American civic
life, and concluding that revitalization of American democracy might depend on rebuilding such
membership organizations).
177. “I believe, as a teacher, that the people do need novels and dramas and paintings and
poems ‘because they will be called upon to vote.’” Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
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order to enable popular sovereignty, then speech that enables democracy
deserves special consideration. Conversely, speech that thwarts democracybuilding activity should be considered more suspect.
Organization at work also implicates the First Amendment in that it
enables working people to play a larger role in the public debate. By this I
do not refer to the ability of workers to speak publicly about the conditions
of their work, through boycotts, strikes, or pickets, nor do I mean to refer to
public employees’ grievances and the question of whether such grievances
deserve First Amendment protection, although working conditions arguably
are matters of profound public concern.178 Rather, I mean that organization
enables working people to collectively challenge the corporate agenda in
the public arena, whether through pooling their voices, their voting power,
or their financial resources.179 On topics ranging from health care to
NAFTA to the Family Medical Leave Act, individual workers have little
ability to be heard: They are alone on the street corner and without the
resources of large corporations. In the aggregate, however, they have the
power to communicate effectively.
Advocates of the Wagner Act recognized this. They saw collective
bargaining as necessary, not only to dismantle economic inequalities and to
bring the values of democracy to industry, but also to vindicate workers’

Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263 (quoting Harry Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15-16).
178. There is a good deal of scholarship and doctrine debating whether “labor speech” such
as boycotts and pickets, as well as public-employee grievances, should be protected under the
First Amendment. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Court struck down a state
anti-picketing statute and held that the First Amendment protected picketing. The Court declared:
In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning the
facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution. . . . [L]abor relations are not matters of mere local or
private concern. Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of
labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the
processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.
Id. at 102-03 (citations omitted).
The constitutional status of labor speech, and especially labor picketing, has declined sharply
since 1940. Labor speech, both in the form of collective action and employee grievances, is now
often considered unprotected as economic activity or as a matter of private concern. See, e.g.,
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that an employee’s grievance, expressed through
a questionnaire, was not a matter of public concern and was therefore unprotected by the First
Amendment). For an analysis of the constitutional protection of labor picketing, see Pope, Labor
and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 1094-96, 1113-18; Cynthia Estlund, Note, Labor Picketing
and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J.
938, 940-41 (1981); and Mark D. Schneider, Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First
Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1475-95 (1982).
179. The Supreme Court indirectly recognized this expressly political role of unions in Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), which held that employees cannot be
compelled to contribute financially to unions’ activities that express political views unrelated to
their duties as exclusive bargaining representatives. Without commenting on the merits of the
decision, I think it relevant insofar as it underlines the expressly ideological role that unions often
play.

ANDRIASFINAL

2003]

6/8/2003 5:27 PM

Free Speech in Workplace Elections

2453

rights of expression in national and local politics.180 To some extent, their
vision has been borne out. Unions have constituted a fundamental basis for
progressive coalitions in American politics and have exercised significant
influence in Congress, particularly when it comes to general social
legislation.181 As they have become weaker in the United States and have
come to represent a smaller fraction of the work force, political issues
important to the working class have fallen farther from the public screen,182
creating a debate that is increasingly dominated by corporate interests.
Meiklejohn wrote, “What is essential is not that everyone shall speak but
that everything worth saying shall be said.”183 With the decline of collective
organizations of workers, it becomes increasingly questionable whether
everything worth saying shall be said.
IV. A NEW REGIME: PERMISSIBLE AND OBLIGATORY UNDER THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Given that the current doctrine actually silences worker speech, unfairly
compels workers to listen, excludes pro-union messages voiced by both
workers and union organizers, and thereby limits the existence of
meaningful debate and collective self-governance within and outside of the
workplace, what can be done (or must be done) under the First
Amendment? This Note answers that, in light of the First Amendment’s
goal of ensuring robust debate to enable collective self-governance, new
regulation to enable worker and union speech during workplace
representation elections should be seen as permissible under the First
Amendment and, perhaps more importantly, should be required. That is, the
First Amendment’s commitment to political liberty both allows and
mandates the state to intervene in order to achieve a better balance between
the competing speech rights of workers and employers.

180. See Becker, supra note 7. Conversely, employers sought to minimize unionization
through the Taft-Hartley Act in order to limit the influence of workers in politics. See supra
Section I.C.
181. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 191-206
(1984) (concluding that unions exercise significant power influencing the passage of general
social legislation, although they have less power to enact legislation specific to unionism that
business opposes). In other countries, unions have played an even greater role in shaping the
public debate and in enabling worker speech in society at large. See Kay Lehman Schlozman et
al., Civic Participation and the Equality Problem, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, supra note 176, at 427,
454 (“In many other democracies, politically engaged trade unions serve as partners of parties of
the left in organizing the less affluent.”). Moreover, trade unions have played a democratizing
effect in such countries as Poland. See generally DENIS MACSHANE, SOLIDARITY: POLAND’S
INDEPENDENT TRADE UNION (1981).
182. See Schlozman et al., supra note 181, at 457 (noting that the decreasing presence of
issues of class and economic justice in American political discourse can be explained in part by
“the erosion of the membership and power of labor unions”); id. at 444, 453-57.
183. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9, at 26.
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A. The First Amendment Allows Regulation
Consider first the issue of permissible regulation.184 A new local or
federal law, a revised interpretation of the NLRA, or a state constitutional
interpretation that requires access to the workplace for union organizers and
off-duty workers; that more stringently protects workers’ ability to speak;
that eliminates the compulsion to listen; and that places time, place, and
manner restrictions on employer speech due to the silencing effect of such
speech should be considered permissible under the First Amendment.185
Such state action would not violate the First Amendment because it would
enhance public debate.186 As Justice Black wrote in Associated Press v.
United States, “[The First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public . . . . Freedom . . . from
governmental interference . . . does not sanction repression of that freedom
by private interests.”187
1. Enabling Access
The question of access is the easiest to reconcile with current Supreme
Court doctrine. In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme
Court held that a state did not violate the First Amendment, or the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause, by interpreting its constitution to grant
citizens the right of reasonable speech and petition in privately owned
shopping malls.188 The Court emphasized that the right of property owners
to exclude others was subject to limitation.189 Moreover, the Court

184. My argument concerning permissive regulation draws from the analysis in Owen M.
Fiss, The Censorship of Television, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA
257 (Lee B. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002), but applies the concept beyond the media
and electoral context, for, as discussed above, public debate and democracy happen not only in the
voting booths and in the press but also in the workplace, particularly with regard to the decision of
whether or not to unionize.
185. Obviously, a municipal or state law or a state constitutional interpretation that affects the
process by which private-sector workers elect unions might raise issues of federal preemption.
Although the question of preemption is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to state that
the extent to which local laws are preempted is not an uncontroversial question. Michael
Gottesman, for example, makes a persuasive argument that, “contrary to prevailing wisdom, the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not wholly preempt the states’ ability to adopt laws
facilitating unionization and enhancing employee leverage in collective bargaining with
employers.” Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating
Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 355 (1990). For the purposes of this Note, I will assume no
preemption issues and will focus only on the First Amendment implications of such a rule.
186. Throughout this Part, I use the term “state” to refer to official governmental action,
whether it be by Congress, state government, or municipal government.
187. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (citation omitted).
188. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
189. Dismissing the takings claim, the Court wrote:
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maintained that California’s decision to provide a right of access did not
impinge upon the property owners’ speech rights. By allowing other
citizens to enter the property and engage in free expression, the government
was not forcing the property owner to express particular speech. Thus, the
Court held that states could, consistent with the First and Fifth
Amendments, provide a right of access to private property.
By this same logic, a municipal, state, or federal law allowing union
organizers and off-duty workers access to company property in order to
communicate messages regarding unionization during a representation
election would not violate the First (or Fifth) Amendment. As in
Pruneyard, the views expressed by union organizers and workers granted
access to the property “[would] not likely be identified with those of the
owner,”190 and “no specific message [would be] dictated by the State to be
displayed on appellants’ property.”191 Anti-union off-duty workers would
have the right of access and anti-union consultants already do have such
rights, granted by management. That employers might disagree with the
speech of those granted access is not a bar to regulation. Our taxation
system is ample evidence that an individual’s property can be used to
support activities with which he or she disagrees; in fact, this concept is part
and parcel of our democratic system.192
An objection might be raised that in Pruneyard the property involved
was a shopping center, a forum described by the Court as “open to the
public to come and go as they please,”193 whereas workplaces are not
necessarily open to the public. Yet, this distinction is inapposite for several
reasons. Current law already grants significant rights of access to
workplaces. For example, employers may not exclude customers or workers
on the basis of their race, and they must grant access to government
inspectors of all sorts. Moreover, a regulation granting access to workplaces
in no way would force private owners to “bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”194 Finally,
and most important in light of the purposes of the First Amendment, just as
the mall rendered the street corner obsolete as a political forum, the modern
It is true that one of the essential sticks in the bundle of property rights is the right
to exclude others . . . . But it is well established that not every destruction or injury to
property . . . has been held to be a “taking” in the constitutional sense. Rather, the
determination whether a state law unlawfully infringes a landowner’s property in
violation of the Taking Clause requires an examination of whether the restriction on
private property forc[es] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
Id. at 82-83 (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 87.
191. Id.
192. For elaboration on this point, see OWEN M. FISS, Building a Free Press, in LIBERALISM
DIVIDED, supra note 9, at 139, 156.
193. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 87.
194. Id. at 83 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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landscape of highways and office parks has rendered the street corner
equally ineffective as a means for communication to workers about
unionization. If the goal is to create real deliberation and informed debate
on the important political question of unionization, there is no effective
forum other than the workplace.
2. Barring Employers’ Captive Audience Meetings and Protecting
Worker Expression
While access is important, the state could do more than simply allow
admission to private property. First, the state could outlaw captive audience
or other mandatory meetings, which unfairly require one view to be heard,
and which compel workers to listen. Prohibiting captive audience meetings
in no way would trammel employers’ speech rights, even under an
autonomy version of the First Amendment. The Court, in other contexts,
has repeatedly held that speech to a captive audience is not protected and
can be prohibited.195 Not only could a ban on captive audience meetings be
supported under current doctrine, but such regulation would also further the
democratic aims of the First Amendment by allowing free, rather than
forced, deliberation.
Second, the state could protect workers’ expression of pro-union
messages by eliminating the possibility that such comments can be
actionable as insubordination, as well as by significantly increasing
enforcement mechanisms and sanctions against retaliation on the basis of
pro-union expression. These policy measures, too, would be permissible
under current doctrine. Increasing penalties on employers for suppressing
worker speech in no way would impinge on employers’ speech rights; on
the contrary, it would facilitate worker speech and would significantly
promote meaningful debate and deliberation within the workplace.
3. Limiting the Silencing Speech of Employers
Third, consistent with a democratic reading of the First Amendment,
states or Congress could intervene to enable worker and union speech and
could establish certain limits on employer speech. For example, new
regulation could require equal time for pro-union and anti-union messages,
perhaps by establishing a series of debates during the pre-election period.
Acting as a parliamentarian, the government might also place certain limits
on employer speech because of the silencing effect of such speech. The
state could require total employer neutrality within the workplace with
195. For a discussion of how regulation of captive audience speeches in the union context is
inconsistent with broader First Amendment doctrine, see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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respect to unionization, as the Board initially did in the first years of its
existence.196 This would not mean that anti-union speech need be wholly
proscribed. Instead, limitations placed upon employer speech should be
thought of as time, place, and manner regulations. Employers could still
voice opposition to unions through other forums outside the coercive setting
of the workplace, such as editorials in public papers. Moreover,
employees—because they do not exercise coercive power—could speak out
against unions within the workplace.
In the alternative, the law could be changed so as to collapse the current
artificial distinction between employer “predictions” and threats, making all
such silencing and coercive speech illegal. Such regulations might continue
to allow other nonpredictive speech in certain limited contexts. For
example, new regulation might permit company representatives to make
formal statements opposing unionization or to speak at forums that allowed
both sides to present views, while proscribing speeches made by
supervisors to the workers they oversee.197
The argument that equal time should be established for pro-union
messages, and that employer speech should be further constrained because
196. Several states, including New York and California, have in fact enacted laws that
attempt to reduce silencing and coercive employer speech. See Prohibition on Use of State Funds
and Facilities To Assist, Promote, or Deter Union Organizing, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 16,64516,649 (West Supp. 2003); An Act To Amend the Labor Law, ch. 601, 2002 N.Y. Laws 1413.
These statutes limit the ability of employers to use public money or property to promote or oppose
unionization, and are currently being challenged on both First Amendment and federal preemption
grounds. A district court recently held the California statute to be preempted by the NLRA. The
court did not rule on the First Amendment claim. See Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 225 F.
Supp. 2d 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
197. I emphasize the wide array of options for limiting employer speech with the idea that
state legislatures should be given latitude to determine what regulation would best achieve the
goals of enabling worker speech and achieving a robust debate. I would favor legislation that, in
addition to creating a right of access, banning captive audience meetings, and increasing penalties
for suppression of speech, would require supervisors to remain neutral with respect to
unionization when dealing with employees over whom they have authority. This would leave
room for employers to oppose unions in forums unrelated to their own workplaces. I take this
position because of current conditions under which workers organize—the powerful coercive
effect of employer speech in the employment-at-will context and employees’ widespread belief
that union speech results in retaliation. Because of these factors, strict limits on employer speech
would best enable the individuals who are making the decision about self-governance—the
workers themselves—to engage in free and full discussion. The opposition to my favored solution
would be twofold. First, some might argue that more limited constraints on the silencing speech of
employers could achieve the same goal. In the current typical workplace, I question whether this
is true. However, I would not foreclose legislators’ ability to come up with other options, such as
the debate forums and bans on predictive speech that I suggest in the text, particularly once there
are effective sanctions in place and once retaliation for union speech is no longer so prevalent.
Second, some might argue that my proposals do not allow robust debate, because they exclude
anti-union viewpoints. This is false: Anti-union workers can express their viewpoints and can
draw on anti-union expertise, such as the Right to Work Foundation, if they so desire. Moreover,
this argument seems far removed from reality. In the contemporary American workplace,
employees are acutely aware of their employer’s opposition to unionization and have been
inundated with anti-union arguments for years. I do not suggest that the balance cannot shift, in
the future, if the conditions under which workers organize change.

ANDRIASFINAL

2458

6/8/2003 5:27 PM

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 112: 2415

of its coercive and silencing effect, is a normative argument based on a
democratic reading of the First Amendment. Recall the cases of R.A.V. and
Virginia v. Black. There, the argument of democratic free speech scholars
was that, by banning supremacists’ cross burning, the state was not
unconstitutionally constraining free speech and collective selfdetermination; rather, it was protecting the speech rights of its black
citizens and enhancing public discussion by ending a pattern of behavior
that tended to silence one group and thus distort or skew public debate.198 In
other words, under the democratic theory of the First Amendment, social
equality is critical to free and open debate; by regulating speech that has a
silencing, coercive, and subordinating effect, the state advances the goals of
the First Amendment.
Although this logic about speech on both sides of the equation differs
significantly from the Court’s autonomy focus, in that it allows constraints
on speech in order to enable uninhibited debate and to facilitate democratic
deliberation,199 there is some implicit support for such an argument in
existing doctrine. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, for example, the
Court emphasized the ability of the government to ensure that all
viewpoints are heard; it upheld FCC rules requiring privately owned radio
stations to devote a reasonable percentage of broadcast time to public issues
and to ensure fair coverage for both sides.200 In affirming the FCC’s
regulations, the Court recognized the ability of the state to intervene in
order to ensure the robustness of debate. The FCC later ended the use of the
fairness doctrine, and the Court’s decisions in the 1970s and 1980s declined
to extend the doctrine to other areas.201 However, the state’s ability to
enhance public discussion has recently found support again in the opinions
of Justice Breyer. For example, in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC
(Turner II), Breyer emphasized the ability of the government to enhance
public discussion and to provide for all viewpoints.202 “That
policy . . . seeks to facilitate the public discussion and informed
deliberation, which, as Justice Brandeis pointed out many years ago,
198. FISS, supra note 12, at 117.
199. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (holding that political
expenditures, as protected speech, could not be curbed, and rejecting the argument that
“government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others”).
200. The Court wrote, “Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying
equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government
limit the use of broadcast equipment.” 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969).
201. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-58 (1974).
202. 520 U.S. 180, 226-27 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part). Justice Breyer concurred
with the majority opinion upholding the provisions of a congressional law that required cable
operators to carry the programs of over-the-air broadcasters, thereby guaranteeing that cable
subscribers receive those programs, but he articulated a different theory from Justice Kennedy’s
antitrust theory. Justice Breyer conceptualized the “must-carry” rules as part of a national policy
to further debate. For further discussion, see Fiss, supra note 184, at 282-83.
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democratic government presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to
achieve.”203
Moreover, Breyer recognized that there can be speech interests on both
sides of a regulation, and he wrote that occasionally some speech has to be
restricted in order to further other speech: “I do not deny that the
compulsory carriage that creates the ‘guarantee’ extracts a serious First
Amendment price. . . . This ‘price’ amounts to a ‘suppression of speech.’
But there are important First Amendment interests on the other side as
well.”204 In such cases, Breyer continued, the Court may uphold a statute
regulating speech if it “strikes a reasonable balance between potentially
speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences.”205
Several years later, Justice Breyer, this time joined by Justice Ginsburg,
wrote a concurring opinion in a case that upheld a state law imposing dollar
limits on campaign contributions.206 He once again focused the Court on the
purposes of the First Amendment, and attacked the dissenters for
“oversimplifying the problem” and turning a difficult constitutional issue
into “a lopsided dispute between political expression and governmental
censorship.”207 Pointing out that the case of campaign finance was one in
which “constitutionally protected issues lie on both sides of the legal
equation,” Justice Breyer upheld the law on the grounds that, although it
restricted the speech of wealthy contributors, the restriction was limited in
scope and was designed by the legislature to increase public debate and to
strengthen democracy.208
Breyer has addressed the constitutionality of regulations requiring
debate and facilitating certain types of speech in the context of the media
and of campaign financing; the same logic should be applied when
evaluating regulation in the union election context. As demonstrated in Part
II, there are speech interests on both sides of the legal equation in
workplace representation elections, and as argued in Part III, the silencing
of worker speech and the exclusion of union messages under the NLRA
have particular consequences for democracy. The imposition of additional,
but limited, regulations on employer speech, such as those discussed above,
would work to achieve the real purposes of the First Amendment—to
facilitate public discussion and informed deliberation. The safeguarding of
worker speech and the protection of robust debate are compelling reasons
for the state to intervene.209 Because such regulation would enable workers
203. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226-27.
204. Id. at 226.
205. Id. at 227.
206. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 400, 401-03.
209. Such a regime would not be that far from the approach the Board and courts took prior
to the emergence of the one-sided paradigm. See supra Section II.A.
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to speak without fear; would allow pro-union messages to be heard; and
would still permit employers to speak in a noncoercive, nonsilencing
manner, the speech-enhancing consequences of such actions would
outweigh the speech-restrictive ones.210
B. The State’s Affirmative Obligation
An understanding of the political aims of the First Amendment does not
simply demand that this type of government regulation be permitted under
the First Amendment; some form of such state action—specifically a ban
on captive audience meetings, greater protection of worker speech from
employer retaliation, and access rights for organizers and off-duty
workers—should be seen as obligatory. The claim is twofold. First, the First
Amendment demands a new regime because the suppression of worker
speech and pro-union messages is caused not just by private employer
action, but by state action as well.211 As demonstrated in Part II, Congress
enacted the Taft-Hartley Act with the aim of reducing collective action by
workers and the political influence of unions. In the years since, the federal
government has administered and enforced a system of regulation that fails
to protect worker and union speech. In fact, it explicitly allows workers to
be fired for certain speech as insubordination or for refusing to listen to
employer speech; it sharply limits the right of workers and unions to
communicate their messages. In other words, the employer’s autonomy and
its power to silence workers, “because it is guaranteed by law, is
itself . . . an abridgement”212 of the freedom of speech.
Second, even if the history is understood as evidencing less direct state
action, the commitment to democracy and political freedom embodied in
the First Amendment imposes an affirmative obligation on government to
intervene in order to ensure protection of worker speech and union
messages. Just as the state can censor, nongovernmental entities can
exercise “managerial censorship”; this, too, can violate the First
Amendment.213 The argument that the state has an affirmative obligation to
protect union and worker speech from private censorship, while it requires a
larger leap from precedent,214 is well-grounded in the First Amendment’s
210. See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226-27 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (stating that the statute
at issue should be upheld if the method is not significantly more restrictive than alternative
possible methods and if the speech-enhancing consequences would outweigh the speechrestricting ones).
211. For a development of the argument that state action should be conceived of more
broadly, see generally Sunstein, Free Speech Now, supra note 9.
212. Id. at 262 (arguing that what seems to be free speech in markets might amount to an
abridgement of speech).
213. See Fiss, supra note 184, at 265-67.
214. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (rejecting the notion that the First
Amendment requires a right of access to private workplaces for union organizers).
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commitment to political liberty and democracy, and it finds some implicit
support in Court jurisprudence. The Court has occasionally recognized that
private actors can threaten public debate just as much as state actors, and
that the state may be the only power in society capable of keeping these
forces at bay.215
The Court’s recognition of the state’s affirmative obligation to protect
speech can be traced to Justice Black’s dissent in Feiner v. New York.216 In
Feiner, Justice Black was adamant that the state was required by the First
Amendment to prevent a speaker from being silenced by a crowd who
disagreed with his message. Justice Black wrote, “[The police officers’]
duty was to protect petitioner’s right to talk, even to the extent of arresting
the man who threatened to interfere.”217 Black’s insistence that the
government has, in some circumstances, an affirmative obligation to protect
individuals from being silenced by private citizens later would become
majority doctrine. For example, decisions of federal courts throughout the
civil rights era made plain that the police had an affirmative responsibility
to protect civil rights demonstrators from being silenced by angry white
Southerners.218
Just as the state had an affirmative obligation to protect the street corner
speaker in Feiner, the democratic state in the context of union elections has
an affirmative obligation to prevent citizens—in this case, workers—from
being silenced by private entities. To borrow Justice Black’s words, the
government’s duty is to protect the workers’ “right to talk, even to the
extent” of sanctioning and punishing the employers who “threaten to
interfere.” The decision of the police officer to turn a blind eye to the crowd
in Feiner constituted an act of the state and, therefore, a violation of the
First Amendment. Similarly, the decision of the NLRB and the Court to
turn a blind eye to the silencing of worker speech and to the exclusion of
pro-union messages violates the First Amendment. If the state fails to
intervene against such repression of speech, then the First Amendment
215. For a more thorough analysis of the doctrinal and theoretical basis for the state’s
affirmative obligation to act to protect speech, see Owen Fiss, The Idea of Political Freedom, in
LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 35, 46-52 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
216. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). In Feiner, a crowd of people grew restless while listening to Feiner
make a controversial political speech. An onlooker threatened to silence Feiner himself if police
officers did not do so. The police asked Feiner to stop speaking. When he refused, they arrested
him. The Court upheld the conviction and treated the police directive as a reasonable attempt to
maintain order. Id. at 320. Justice Black, in dissent, vehemently disagreed with the Court’s
conclusion.
217. Id. at 327 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Fiss, supra note 215, at 47. The importance of
Black’s insistence that the state had an affirmative obligation to deny street corner “hecklers” a
veto over other citizens’ speech was first discussed by KALVEN, supra note 60, at 140-41.
218. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (reversing the convictions of civil
rights activists that had been predicated on the hostile reaction that their speech would have
elicited from whites); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (ordering state
police to provide protection for Dr. King’s march); see also Fiss, supra note 215, at 47.
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ceases to be an instrument of democracy. Current interpretations of the
NLRA are unconstitutional—the First Amendment demands their
revision—because they fail to create a meaningful debate as they silence
worker and union speech.
CONCLUSION
Current doctrine on workplace representation elections is incompatible
with the requirements of a genuine democracy. A product of employers’
post-Lochner efforts to maintain control over the workplace and the Court’s
conventional autonomy approach to the First Amendment, the current
doctrine wrongly equates free speech in union elections with a formal right
to be free from state interference. In short, Congress, the Board, and the
courts together have systematically legitimated and enforced a legal regime
that enshrines the free speech rights of employers while failing to
acknowledge the presence of labor’s free speech interests on the other side
of the legal equation.
The current regime suppresses worker speech and union messages
within the workplace. Employers are allowed wide latitude to speak under
the protection of the First Amendment, even when their speech has a
silencing effect. Moreover, they routinely and harshly suppress pro-union
speech (in violation of the NLRA but without real penalty), while they
exercise their managerial and property rights to exclude union messages
and to compel workers to listen. Not only is worker speech inhibited within
the workplace, but the current system also limits the scope of public debate
outside of the workplace, and decreases the ability of workers to participate
in the project of self-governance. This is both because workers are denied
rights of expression and participation at work and because the system
serves to inhibit the free formation of collective worker organizations
capable of participating in the public debate. Because the state has acted to
enforce this system (and, simultaneously, has failed to act to remedy it), the
state prevents the First Amendment from serving its purpose as our
society’s main safeguard for, and instrument of, democracy.
A legal framework more faithful to the First Amendment’s democratic
aims would effectively protect workers’ ability to engage in pro-union
speech, would eliminate employers’ power to compel workers to listen to
anti-union speech, and would grant off-duty workers and union organizers
access to the workplace and freedom to communicate pro-union messages
to workers. Moreover, new local, state, and federal laws creating additional
restrictions upon employer speech would be held permissible, even if not
compelled by the First Amendment. As Justice Breyer has written,
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regulation that limits speech is allowable when “there are important First
Amendment interests on the other side as well.”219
Ultimately, new regulation to protect worker speech and union
messages is vital public policy. Unless the law is changed, private
censorship will continue unrestrained, worker-citizens will continue to be
silenced, and valuable public debate in this country’s workplaces and in
society will continue to be inhibited. Before another 10,000 workers a year
suffer retaliation for their union speech, and before the public debate
becomes even more dominated by corporate interests, new regulation is
needed. Unless we revise the outdated paradigm that systematically
undermines basic freedoms, the First Amendment will remain mere rhetoric
to millions of workers who are unable to exercise their voices freely.
Moreover, without such change, the essential promise of the First
Amendment—“our common agreement that, working together as a body
politic, we will be our own rulers”220—will remain unrealized.

219. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 226 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part).
220. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 9, at 75.

